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Enforcing the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Regime: The
Legality of Preventive Measures
CristianDeFrancia*

ABSTRACT

Efforts to limit the proliferation of nuclear weapons and
nuclear-weapons-related technology have increasingly involved
economic, technological, and military forms of coercion
implemented in an environment of low-level conflict. Coercive
counterproliferationmeasures have included a range of actions,
including targeted economic sanctions, industrial sabotage,
cyber attacks, targeted killings, and military strikes. While the
nonproliferation obligations of states are well-established under
relevant treaties, state practice, and the international
monitoring system of the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA), norms relating to the enforcement of those obligations
are not clearly defined in legal instruments. This Article reviews
the legality of prevention and enforcement measures through the
institutional framework of the global nonproliferation regime,
considering the tensions between that framework and a range of
cross-cutting disciplines of internationallaw, including the law
of nonforcible intervention, state responsibility, and the law of
force. The Article advocates the continuing development of
consistent technical criteria to determine proliferation risk at
the institutional level of the IAEA monitoring system, and the
prioritization of that system in the enforcement of
nonproliferation obligations. It addresses the key legal issues
associated with the full range of counterproliferationprevention
and enforcement options, providing a comprehensive framework
to facilitate the refinement of legal norms guiding global
counterproliferationefforts.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Since the earliest days of atomic energy, the international
community has sought to find ways to prevent the use of that
technology in nuclear weapons development.1 In 1963, President John
F. Kennedy predicted that fifteen to twenty-five states would have
nuclear weapons by the 1970s. 2 Since that time, five nations legally
qualified to join the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty3 (NPT) as
nuclear-weapon states, another three states that never joined the
Treaty are generally understood to possess nuclear weapons, and
another state, the Democratic Republic of North Korea (DPRK),
developed nuclear weapons after withdrawing from the Treaty. The
success of the global nonproliferation regime has largely exceeded
President Kennedy's expectations, though challenges remain.
Preventing the diversion of nuclear technology to military uses has
and will remain a top priority for the international community,
requiring continued consideration of the legality of related measures
of prevention.
Tense historical moments relating to the deployment and spread
of nuclear weapons range from the Cuban Missile Crisis, to Israel's
attack on Iraq's Osirak reactor, to the First and Second Gulf Wars in
Iraq, to the ongoing standoffs with the DPRK and Iran. In more
recent years, various measures have been taken to target alleged
nuclear weapons development programs, including air strikes against
Syria and various forms of sabotage against Iran. 4 In the midst of
these events, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
endeavors to maintain an effective and globally applicable monitoring
system to verify that atomic energy is used for exclusively peaceful

1.
See, e.g., Agreed Declaration by the President of the United States of
America, the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland, and the Prime Minister of Canada Relating to Atomic Energy art. 6, Nov. 15,
1945, 26 U.N.T.S. 123 (calling for an enforceable "system of safeguards" to prevent the
military uses of nuclear energy); G.A. Res. 49/1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/49/1 (Jan. 24, 1964)
(calling for the establishment of a commission to ensure the use of atomic energy for
exclusively peaceful purposes and for effective safeguards to further this end).
2.
Remarks at the El Coco Airport, Costa Rica, upon Leaving for the United
States, 1964 PUB. PAPERS 280 (mar. 21, 1963).
3.
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, opened for signature
July 1, 1968, 21 U.S.T. 483, 729 U.N.T.S. 161 (entered into force Mar. 5, 1970)
[hereinafter NPT].
4.
See, e.g., Dan Bilefsky, U.N. Nuclear Watchdog Presses Case Against Syria,
N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 2011, at A6; Scott Shane, Adversaries of Iran Said to Be Stepping
up Covert Actions, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 2012, at Al.
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purposes. As rhetoric heats up over possible military dimensions of
Iran's nuclear energy program, and with some degree of low-level
conflict underway, questions of the legality of measures to prevent
the spread of nuclear weapons gain renewed prominence.
Counterproliferation
prevention
and
enforcement
measures
addressed in this Article include peaceful measures effected through
diplomatic channels, as well as coercive measures, including economic
sanctions, sabotage, and force.
The global nonproliferation regime comprises both cooperative
and coercive legal and political mechanisms, including the NPT, the
IAEA's system of safeguards, the Chapter VII authority of the UN
Security Council, and the sovereign authorities of individual states.
The legal core of the nonproliferation regime is the NPT, under which
member states that did not possess nuclear weapons as of January 1,
1967, 5 agree not to use nuclear technology for military purposes in
exchange for established rights to receive and use nuclear technology
for peaceful purposes. Non-nuclear-weapon states parties to the NPT
agree to the application of IAEA "safeguards" to their peaceful
nuclear energy programs, 6 which are agreements between the IAEA
and states designed to facilitate the auditing, monitoring, and
inspection of nuclear energy programs. Under this system, it is the
task of the IAEA to provide credible assurances that nuclear energy is
used for exclusively peaceful purposes. The application of consistent
criteria to assess proliferation risk and safeguards compliance is
critical to this task.
The IAEA safeguards system consists of (1) safeguards
agreements implemented in accordance with relevant treaties, 7 most
notably the NPT and Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaties (NWFZ),8
(2) the Statute of the IAEA, to the extent it is incorporated into

5.
NPT, supra note 3, art. IX(3). Five states parties to the NPT qualified to
join as nuclear-weapons states-China, France, the Russian Federation, the United
Kingdom, and the United States. See generally INT'L ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY [IAEA],
THE SAFEGUARDS SYSTEM OF THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY

10 (2011)

[hereinafter IAEA SAFEGUARDS SYSTEM], available at http://www.iaea.org/OurWork/
SV/Safeguards/documents/safegsystem.pdf.
6.
NPT, supra note 3, art. 111. 1.
7.
States that are not subject to comprehensive safeguards requirements may
enter into "item-specific" safeguards on a voluntary basis to facilitate trade with states
parties to the NPT. See generally Cristian DeFrancia, The Continuing Role of ItemSpecific Safeguards in the IAEA Safeguards System, 88 NUCLEAR L. BULL. 33, 37-38
(2011).

8.
See Central Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone, Sept. 8, 2006, available at
cns.miis.edulinventory/pdfs/aptcanwz.pdf; African Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaty,
Apr. 11, 1996, 35 I.L.M. 698; Treaty on the Southeast Asian Nuclear Weapon-FreeZone Treaty, opened for signature Dec. 15, 1995, 1981 U.N.T.S. 129; South Pacific
Nuclear Free Zone Treaty, opened for signature Aug. 6, 1985, 1445 U.N.T.S. 177;
Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean,
opened for signatureFeb. 14, 1967, 22 U.S.T. 762, 634 U.N.T.S. 281.
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safeguards agreements, and (3) practices of the IAEA that have
evolved in the implementation of safeguards agreements. As the
principal international agency responsible for monitoring the peaceful
uses of nuclear energy, the IAEA plays a central role in verifying that
states adhere to their nonproliferation obligations through its
safeguards system. Problems arise when states elude, or are
perceived to elude the verification authority of the IAEA's monitoring
system. When questions of noncompliance with safeguards
agreements arise, the IAEA may impose a limited range of remedial
measures, including special inspections, denial of assistance, or
suspension of membership. 9 The IAEA Statute and its safeguards
agreements generally require that instances of noncompliance be
reported to the Security Council.' 0
When issues of possible noncompliance with safeguards
agreements are referred out of -the IAEA, the Security Council
assumes legal responsibility for determining appropriate prevention
and enforcement steps. While state compliance with safeguards
agreements is a key factor in determining whether a state is
complying
with
legal
nonproliferation
obligations,
legal
determinations of NPT noncompliance are not directly within the
province of the IAEA. The global nonproliferation regime relies on a
broader framework for the development of nonproliferation norms.
Specific legal authority for interpreting the NPT may rest with the
NPT review conference of states parties 11 or under limited
circumstances through a judicial forum such as the International
Court of Justice. 12 Security Council and state practice may provide
evidence of internationally agreed interpretations or even customary
law. The development of nonproliferation norms thus takes place in a
mixed law and -policy framework, involving the administration of
voluntarily entered legal agreements and the enforcement of those
agreements through a collective security apparatus. Although nuclear
law is highly specialized, the employment of coercive measures to
enforce nonproliferation obligations implicates a range of crosscutting international law disciplines, including the law of
international sanctions, use of force law, and the law of intervention.
Measures aimed at preventing the spread of nuclear weapons
need not be coercive. The optimal mechanism to resolve any doubts
about possible military dimensions of a State's nuclear energy
program is through the IAEA's safeguards system. When the IAEA
can provide credible assurances that a state's nuclear energy program

9.
Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency art. XIII, Oct. 26, 1956,
1 U.S.T. 1093, 276 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter IAEA Statute].
10.
Id.
11.
See NPT, supranote 3, art. VIII(3).
12.
See generally Edwin J. Nazario, Note, The Potential Role of Arbitration in
the Nuclear Non-ProliferationRegime, 10 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 139 (1999).
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is used for exclusively peaceful purposes, coercive measures to
prevent the acquisition of nuclear weapons are wholly unnecessary.
Even in cases when the IAEA refers a state to the Security Council
for noncompliance with safeguards agreements, the suspect state may
begin to resolve proliferation concerns directly with the IAEA, by
fully participating in the safeguards system. 13 It is important in this
context that diplomatic efforts to address proliferation-related crises
permit a rolling back of coercive measures (e.g., sanctions) in
exchange for cooperation as a means to avoid vicious circles of crisis
escalation. 14 The technical verification role of the IAEA under its
safeguards system provides a primary mechanism for preventing the
spread of nuclear weapons, the effective operation of which should be
the aim of any prevention and enforcement measures.
The Security Council's role in addressing state noncompliance
with nonproliferation obligations underscores the depth of
international concern about the issue. The principal role of the
Security Council in the UN system is to address threats to
international peace and security. It has various coercive tools
available to it under Chapter VII of the UN Charter (assuming that
nine of its members agree and none of the permanent members vote
against). 15 Article 41 of the Charter empowers the Security Council to
institute coercive measures not involving the use of force, which may
sanctions,
interruption
of
involve,
inter alia, economic
communication, and a cessation of diplomatic relations.1 6 Article 42
empowers the Security Council to authorize the use of force. 17 Due to
the referral mechanism contained in safeguards agreements and the
IAEA Statute, the Security Council has primary responsibility for
enforcing related nonproliferation obligations and the discretion to
determine what measures might be appropriate under the UN
Charter.
Various prevention and enforcement measures have been
undertaken by the Security Council and individual states and groups

13.
See, e.g., Rick Gladstone & William J. Broad, Iran Is Pressed on Access for
Nuclear Inspectors, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 2012, at All (discussing role of IAEA in
resolving concerns relating to possible military dimensions of Iran's nuclear energy
program).
Despite its central role in the global nonproliferation regime, however, the
14.
IAEA's role relates principally to technical verification of the peaceful uses of atomic
energy. Neither the IAEA's Statute nor safeguards agreements envision for it a role as
act as an
a political intermediary. The IAEA may, however, "if requested to do so ....
intermediary for the purposes of securing the performance of services or the supplying
of materials, equipment, or facilities by one member of the Agency for another ...
IAEA Statute, supra note 9, art. III.A. 1.
15.
U.N. Charter art. 27, para. 3.
16.
Id. art. 41.
17.
Id. art. 42.
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of states to target states suspected of developing nuclear weapons.18
These measures have included condemnation, economic sanctions,
travel bans, interdiction of weapons-related material, sabotage, and
the unilateral or collective use of force. Reliance on a Security Council
resolution may signal some legal clarity about whether particular
actions are lawful, while unilateral measures taken by states often
lack the benefit of that textual clarity.
On the economic level, legal options exist for states to implement
sanctions-unilaterally or collectively-without Security Council
authorization. Additionally, states may cooperate under multilateral
regimes to deny or place conditions upon the provision of certain
forms of sensitive technology to states. International law permits
broad freedom of action in the economic sphere, although unilateral
economic action will not be as effective as coordinated multilateral or
international action. Putting aside questions of the effectiveness of
economic sanctions, there is significant precedent for coordinated and
comprehensive international sanctions targeting a wide range of
economic activity. Legal questions involving unilateral sanctioning
efforts generally center on the legal effect of sanctions on third
parties that do business with the target state, and increasingly, on
due process
rights. 19 Unilateral
attempts
at exercising
extraterritorial jurisdiction in economic relationships may not
necessarily be a violation of international law, but extraterritorial
authority can be legally counteracted by third-party states that have
conflicting legal policies (although corporations may nonetheless
comply for business reasons).
The low-level conflict now typical in the counterproliferation
context invites renewed focus on the distinctions between
international law on the use of force and the law prohibiting certain
forms of intervention in a state's internal affairs. Tactics of low-level
conflict may include sabotage of industrial systems, cyber attacks, or
interdictions. These tactics may not in all cases be significant enough
to constitute a use of force under international law. Uses of force are
categorically prohibited under the UN Charter unless authorized by

18.
The terms "prevention," "preventive," and "enforcement" are not strictly
associated with the use or nonuse of force in the international legal context. The UN
Charter variously uses the terms "measures for the prevention and removal of a
threats to the peace," U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 1, "preventive action," id. art. 2, para.
5, "enforcement action," id. arts. 1, 5, 53, "preventive measures," id. art. 50, and
"enforcement measures," id. arts. 2, 50. The Charter does not preclude the application
of force in its use of the term preventive measures and the UN High-Level Panel on
Threats has expressly contemplated preventive military action. Chairman of the HighLevel Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change, A More Secure World: Our Shred
Responsibility: Rep, of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, U.N.
Doc. A/59/565 (Dec. 2, 2004).
19.
See discussion infra Part V.
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the Security Council under Article 4220 or taken in self-defense under
Article 51.21 The fact that the behavior targeted by a use of force is
itself wrongful is not generally recognized as providing an excuse to
use force. If force is not involved, the legality of actions targeting
wrongful behavior may be considered under the legal framework of a
general prohibition upon intervention in the internal affairs of states,
which may apply when force is not used. The law of intervention,
which overlaps with and his been largely overshadowed by the law of
force in recent years, deserves renewed attention in light of its
potential application to situations of low-level conflict in which force
may not be involved. Because the categorical prohibition that applies
to uses of force will not necessarily apply to acts of intervention in a
state's affairs, the law of countermeasures may be applicable in cases
of intervention that do not involve a use of force, providing more clear
legal rules for low-level conflict involving counterproliferation.
In the case' of nonforcible intervention, principles of state
responsibility may apply, permitting countermeasures when those
measures target the cessation of an unlawful act. Legal problems
multiply in the context of low-level conflict relating to proliferation,
however, as international law lacks clarity on (1) what constitutes a
use of force, (2) the legal character of nonproliferation obligations
(specifically, what behavior may be considered wrongful in the
context of proliferation), and (3) what legal framework applies to
targeted counterproliferation measures. The question of what
qualifies as illegal behavior in the context of proliferation may be
crucial to determining whether certain forms of nonforcible
intervention are legally permissible as countermeasures.
International efforts to interdict illicit shipments in nuclear
materials similarly raise questions concerning the dividing line
between forcible and nonforcible measures, as well as the distinction
between military and police actions. The authority to interdict is
generally a function of the sovereign consent of the flag-state of the
vessel, leaving a critical legal gap when rogue states engage in
trafficking on the high seas. Nearly five decades after the Cuban
Missile Crisis, the interdiction of nuclear-weapons-related material
without flag-state consent on the high seas remains legally
problematic. As new legal regimes develop to criminalize aspects of
the trade in nuclear weapons and proliferation-sensitive materials,
the interdiction of such material may be considered either on a model
of police action and law enforcement, or under the law on the use of
force. In this context, the question of whether there is a meaningful
distinction between the use of force and police action has not been
fully vetted or resolved in international law. Recent trends permitting

20.
21.

U.N. Charter art. 42.
Id. art. 51.
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the apprehension of suspects for international criminal prosecution
support such a distinction. 22 The development of a criminal law
regime targeting proliferation-related shipments may provide some
space for the lawful exercise of domestic authorities on the high seas.
Finally, assuming that certain proliferation-related behavior can
be defined as illegal, and coercive measures may be legally employed
domestically and unilaterally to counteract such behavior, it is
important to anticipate the desired effect of such measures in the
framework of the nonproliferation regime. While coercion may be
useful in certain situations, a successful end game requires that
coercive actions do not become an independent source of conflict. A
successful nonproliferation regime is ultimately a cooperative regime,
centered around effective international monitoring in which states
are at all phases given opportunities to return to the diplomatic
negotiating table. Most importantly, a successful nonproliferation
regime is one in which the IAEA is able to provide assurances that
nuclear energy is used for exclusively peaceful purposes.
This Article considers the global nonproliferation regime in both
its cooperative and coercive elements, outlining the range of legal
issues presented by efforts to contain the use of nuclear technology in
the wider framework of international law. The first sections of the
Article address the core features of the nonproliferation system,
including important legal definitions and the institutional framework
of the IAEA and its safeguards system. The latter sections address
the legality of actions taken by states both unilaterally and within
the collective security apparatus of the Security Council, including
economic sanctions, interdiction, sabotage, and the use of force. In the
course of this analysis, the Article calls attention to the need for
clarity on definitions relating to proliferation, the use of force,
intervention, and distinctions between international police and
military actions. The emergence of more predictable prevention and
enforcement norms in the nuclear nonproliferation context is critical
to the task of achieving the security of a world free of nuclear
weapons. This Article endeavors to illustrate the framework of the
global nonproliferation regime that permits the continuing
development of clear yet adaptive prevention and enforcement norms.

22.
See, e.g., Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 58, July 17,
1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 (outlining procedures for arrest and detention of war crimes
suspects).
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II. DEFINING THE PROBLEM: WHAT IS PROLIFERATION
AND WHEN IS IT ILLEGAL?

While it is fairly clear that proliferation of nuclear weapons and
nuclear-weapons-related technology is generally prohibited for states
integrated into the global nonproliferation regime, it is less clear
what sorts of behaviors count as proliferation. Prevailing standards of
nonproliferation law may be found in an amalgam of relevant treaty
texts, state practice, IAEA practice, and Security Council
pronouncements. The basic framework of the global nonproliferation
regime begins with the NPT. The Treaty embodies core norms of
nonproliferation, articulated in Articles 1 and 2, namely that nuclearweapons states should not assist non-nuclear-weapon states in
developing nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices and that
non-nuclear-weapon states may not manufacture, acquire, or seek to
develop such weapons or devices. Two principal institutions are
responsible for compliance and enforcement matters under this
regime, the IAEA and the Security Council. Under Article 3 of the
NPT, non-nuclear-weapon states parties are required to conclude
safeguards agreements with the IAEA as a mechanism to verify their
commitments to the exclusively peaceful uses of nuclear energy under
the NPT.2 3 The IAEA's authorities extend to auditing, monitoring,
24
and inspecting nuclear energy programs under these agreements,
while the Council's prevention and enforcement powers are rooted in
the broader political context of maintaining peace and security, 25 with
authority to approve action up to and including force.
.Nonproliferation enforcement norms have developed largely
through state practice in
restricting proliferation-sensitive
technologies and the-.Security Council's practical exercise of its
enforcement authorities. The global nonproliferation regime cannot
be reconciled by reference to the NPT alone, as the Treaty is not at
this time universally applicable. Broadly applicable norms have
nonetheless evolved through the implementation of the NPT and
related nonproliferation agreements, principally through verification
and enforcement activities of the IAEA, states, and the Security
Council. 26 These entities have carved out a host of authorities for
international and state-based measures to prevent proliferation
beyond the strictures of the NPT.

NPT, supranote 3, art. III.
23.
24.
Id.
25.
U.N. Charter art. 24.
26.
See generally Abram Chayes, An Inquiry into the Workings of Arms Control
Agreements, 85 HARV. L. REV. 905, 945-46 (1972) (discussing verification and
enforcement elements of arms control agreements).
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A. Proliferationas an InternationallyWrongful Act
The Security Council has long considered proliferation to be a
threat to international peace and security, meriting the application of
preventive measures. Meeting at the heads of state level in 1992, the
President of the Security Council, speaking on behalf of the members,
declared -that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD)
represents "a threat to international peace and security." 27 States
were encouraged to take "appropriate action" to "prevent the spread
of technology related to the research for or production of such
weapons." 28 Regarding the proliferation of nuclear weapons, the
Security Council further stated that "members of the Council will
take appropriate measures" in the event that the IAEA notifies them
of any violations of safeguards agreements. 29 By these
pronouncements, the Security Council reinforced the proposition that
a duty not to proliferate nuclear weapons is an obligation owed
broadly by states to the international community. In this respect,
nonproliferation legal norms have attained heightened status under
international law as obligations owed by states "erga omnes" toward
the international community as a whole. 30 The Council's
determinations, coupled with other international instruments seeking
to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, 31 as well as the prevalence

27.
President of the S.C., Note by the President of the Security Council, at 4,
U.N. Doc. S/23500 (Jan. 31, 1992). This statement was reiterated in a series of
subsequent Security Council Resolutions dealing with specific instances of
noncompliance with the NPT and general matters of proliferation. See Orde F. Kittrie,
Averting Catastrophe: Why the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Is Losing Its
Deterrence Capacity and How to Restore It, 28 MICH. J. INT'L L. 337, 340 n.12 (2007)
(noting that the Security Council has deemed nuclear proliferation to be a "threat to
international peace and security,", and thus nuclear proliferation is subject to its
Chapter VII sanctioning authority regardless of whether or not the proliferation
activity violates the NPT, another treaty, or customary international law).
28.
U.N. Doc. S/23500, supra note 27, at 4.
29.
Id.
See, e.g., Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co. (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J.
30.
4, 32 (Feb. 5) ("[A]n essential distinction should be drawn between the obligations of a
State towards the international community as a whole, and those arising vis-a-vis
another State in the field of diplomatic protection. By their very nature the former are
the concern of all States. In view of the importance'of the-rights .involved, all States can
be held to have a legal interest in their protection; they are obligations erga omnes.").
See, e.g., International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear
31.
Terrorism pmbl., Apr. 13, 2005, 2445 U.N.T.S. 89 ("[I]oting that acts of nuclear
terrorism may result in the gravest consequences and may pose a threat to
international peace and security ....); Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty
pmbl., opened for signature Sept. 24, 1996, 35 I.L.M. 1439; Convention on the Physical
Protection of Nuclear Material, Oct. 26, 1979, T.I.A.S. 11080 ("Desiring to avert the
potential dangers posed by the unlawful taking and use of nuclear materials ....);
IAEA Statute, supra note 9, art. II ("[S]eek[ing] to accelerate and enlarge the
contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity throughout the world.");
Int'l Maritime Org. [IMO], Protocol of 2005 to the Convention for the Suppression of
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of multilateral nuclear weapon free zones, leaves little doubt that a
norm of proliferation has evolved under multiple legal regimes and
that action may be necessary to prevent or respond to it. Although the
Security Council is not a legislative institution, its pronouncements
are not devoid of legal effect, 3 2 and, in the case of nonproliferation
norms, those pronouncements reflect international practice and
lawmaking.
To the extent that the NPT provides the edifice of
nonproliferation law, two Achilles heels present themselves. First, the
Treaty is not universal insofar as three states-India, Pakistan, and
Israel-never signed it. It cannot be denied that the nonproliferation
regime originated as a voluntary regime. States that did not enter
into the Treaty are not bound by its terms. Reconciling the decision of
these three states to remain outside of the NPT regime with a global
norm against nuclear weapons proliferation is a formidable
challenge. 3 Second, Article 10 of the NPT allows for a state to
withdraw "if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the
subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests
of its country. '' 34 As Tom Coppen and Guido den Dekker note, the
NPT withdrawal clause is framed as permitting withdrawal under a
subjective standard, arguably providing a state some degree of
discretion as to what constitutes extraordinary events meriting
withdrawal. 35 Even if withdrawal from the Treaty can be
accomplished on a purely subjective basis, however, withdrawing to
develop nuclear weapons with the use of technology acquired in the
framework of the Treaty fundamentally violates the spirit of the
agreement and cannot cure a breach that occurred during the period
when the state was party. To the extent that a state withdraws from
the Treaty in order to conceal a breach, residual obligations may exist
under the NPT and related safeguards agreements pertaining to the
period prior to withdrawal. 36 Moreover, states parties to the NPT are

Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, pmbl. para. 13, IMO Doc.
LEG/CONF.15/21 (Nov. 1, 2005) [hereinafter SUA Protocol], available at
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/58426.pdf
("BELIEVING that it is
necessary to adopt provisions ... to suppress additional terrorist acts of violence
against the safety and security of international maritime navigation and to improve its
effectiveness .... ").
32.
See U.N. Charter art. 103 (stating that obligations under the UN Charter
are superior to conflicting obligations under other international agreements).
33.
See discussion infra Part IV.C.
34.
NPT, supra note 3, art. 10.
35.
Guido den Dekker & Tom Coppen, Termination and Suspension of, and
Withdrawal from, WMD Arms Control Agreements in Light of the General Law of
Treaties, 17 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 25 (2012) (discussing the subjective character
of the NPT withdrawal clause).
36.
See generally Antonio F. Perez, Survival of Rights Under the Nuclear NonProliferation Treaty: Withdrawal and the Continuing Right of International Atomic
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fully integrated in the global nonproliferation regime, and exit would
in most cases be considered as a potential threat to international
37
peace and security within the framework of the Security Council.
The mere declaration of a threat to peace and security does not
necessarily indicate that all of the activity associated with the threat
is internationally wrongful as a legal matter, however. 38 Although a
refusal to fulfill a treaty obligation is usually a violation of
international law, 39 the extent of activities that could be deemed
wrongful under the broader legal norm of nonproliferation is less
clear. Thus, rights relating to different parts of the nuclear fuel cycle
remain in flux. The IAEA and Security Council treatment of
particular instances will, however, carry great weight in determining
whether specific proliferation-related activities are wrongful under
international law. 40 Posing the question of whether certain
proliferation activities are internationally wrongful is an important
step in determining the legality of counterproliferation measures
designed to address those activities.

Energy Agency Safeguards, 34 VA. J. INT'L L. 749, 823-26 (1994) (discussing post-NPT
withdrawal rights in terms of the survivability of safeguards).
37.
See generally Geoffrey S. Carlson, An Offer They Can't Refuse? The Security
Council Tells North Korea to Re-Sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, 46 COLUM.
J. TRANSNAT'L L. 420 (arguing that Security Council Resolution 1718 calling upon
North Korea to return to the NPT after its first nuclear weapons test on October 9,
2006 was a legal and prudent action on the part of the Security Council).
See James Crawford, The Relationship Between Sanctions and
38.
Countermeasures, in UNITED NATIONS SANCTIONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 57 (Vera
Gowlland-Debbas ed., 2001); Pierre-Marie Dupuy, Apr~s la guerre du Golfe, 95 REVUE
GENERALE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 621, 622 (1991) (Fr.). On the distinction
between Security Council law-determining and law-enforcing powers, see generally
Gaetano Arangio-Ruiz, On the Security Council's "Law-Making," 83 RIvISTA DI DIRITTO
INTERNAZIONALE 609, 627 (It.) (criticizing the Security Council's lawmaking role but
recognizing the Security Council's powers to affect rights and obligations of states that
are incompatible with authorized Chapter VII measures) and also Vera GowllandDebbas, Security Council Enforcement Action and Issues of State Responsibility, 43
INT'L & COMP. L.Q 55, 78 (1994) (noting that where the Security Council links threat
determinations to breaches of fundamental international obligations, "[s]uch
determinations have had a definitive legal effect, as well as extensive legal
consequences").
39.
See, e.g., Interpretation of Peace Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary and
Romania, Second Phase, Advisory Opinion, 1950 I.C.J. 221, 228 (July 18) ("[R]efusal to
fulfill a treaty obligation involves international responsibility."). See generally Rep. of
the Int'l Law Comm'n, 53d Sess., Apr. I-June 1, July 2-Aug. 10, 2001, Annex, at 43,
U.N. Doc. A/56/10; GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10 (2001), reprinted in [2001] 2 Y.B.
Int'l L. Comm'n 1, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A]2001/Add.1 (Part 1) [hereinafter Draft
Articles on State Responsibility with Commentaries].
On the significance of IAEA findings for determinations of wrongfulness,
40.
see N. Jansen Calamita, Sanctions, Countermeasures,and the Iranian Nuclear Issue,
42 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1393, 1420-21, 1434-37 (2009).
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B. Moving Toward a Definition of Proliferation
Behaviors qualifying as proliferation are not generally defined
under international law. 4 1 The relevant legal instruments do not
directly define what acts qualify as proliferation, yet these
instruments represent the principal guides to determining whether it
has occurred. Although states possess a right to the peaceful uses of
atomic energy under the NPT, certain "proliferation-sensitive"
aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle, such as uranium enrichment,
reprocessing, and heavy water technology, 42 may bring a state to a
threshold capacity from which breakout to a nuclear weapon becomes
a relatively simple act. Questions inevitably arise as to whether, as a
legal matter, a state can be considered a proliferator prior to the point
at which that state actually possesses a nuclear weapon. The lack of a
clear definition of what qualifies as proliferation makes the task of
answering that question somewhat complex.
The NPT imposes nonproliferation obligations on nuclearweapon states parties (NWS) and non-nuclear-weapon states parties
(NNWS) in Articles 1 and 2. 4 3 These articles generally prohibit (1) the

41.
Extensive consideration has been given in the literature on nuclear politics
to different types of proliferation, namely "vertical" proliferation (an increase in the
weapons of NWS), "horizontal" proliferation (an increase in the number of states that
possess nuclear weapons), and "advanced" proliferation (an increase in the number of
weapons of states that newly possess nuclear weapons), yet these materials are not
instructive as to what constitutes proliferation for a legal determination of
unlawfulness. See generally DANIEL H. JOYNER, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE
PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION, at xiv-xv (2009); Richard L.
Williamson, Jr., Law and the H-Bomb: Strengthening the Nonproliferation Regime to
Impede Advanced Proliferation,28 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 71, 77 (1995) (discussing the
definition of advanced proliferation to include both vertical and horizontal). On the
need to define proliferation from a U.S. perspective, see Paula L. Scalingi, Proliferation
Policy: Managing the Process, 87 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROc. 82, 85-86 (1993).
42.
See infra note 57 and accompanying text.
43.
Article I states:
Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty under-takes not to transfer to
any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or
control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and not in
any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to
manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive
devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices.
NPT, supra note 3, art. I.
Article II states:
Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to receive
the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other
nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices
directly, or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear
weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any
assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive
devices.
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transfer (direct or indirect) of nuclear weapons devices to NNWS (2)
NWS assistance, encouragement, or inducement by a NWS to a
NNWS to manufacture, acquire, or control nuclear weapons or
nuclear explosive devices; and (3) the manufacture, acquisition, and
seeking or receiving assistance in the manufacture of nuclear
weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. 44 Any of these activities
would therefore constitute an act of proliferation. The Treaty also
gives the IAEA jurisdiction to verify, through safeguards agreements
with member states, the nondiversion of nuclear energy from peaceful
uses to nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices, 45 indicating
that diversion is clearly an unlawful act of proliferation under the
Treaty. Noncompliance with safeguards agreements or other
verification mechanisms would also raise adverse inferences relating
to the legality of proliferation activities.
Proliferation concerns outlined in Articles 1 and 2 of the NPT
must'be counterbalanced against states' rights under Article 4(1) of
the Treaty. Article 4(1) provides that nothing in the Treaty should
affect the "inalienable right" of the parties "to develop research,
production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without
discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II of this
Treaty. '46 Article 4(2) also confirms that states parties have a "right
to participate in[] the fullest possible exchange of equipment,
materials, and scientific and technological information for the
peaceful uses of nuclear energy." 47 Commentators have argued that
the right of states to participate in technological exchange is of a
hortatory character and of less significance than the "inalienable
right" under Article 4(1).48 Rights to participate in the trade in
nuclear technology, inalienable under the Treaty, are expressly
granted therein, and thus dependent upon compliance with the
Treaty. The conditioning of Article 4 rights on the prohibition against
the manufacture of nuclear weapons in Articles 1 and 2 nonetheless
leaves open the question of whether states have a right to develop
proliferation-sensitive technologies. Certainly states have done so in
the past under the NPT with the intent to cross the threshold and
acquire a nuclear weapon. The Security Council, as well as
multilateral consortia of states, has seen fit to impose restrictions of a
49
preventative character on such activities.

Id. art. II.
44.
Id.
45.
Id. art. III.
46.
Id. art. 1V(1).
47.
Id. art. 1V(2).
See, e.g., Zhang Xinjun, International Ambiguity and the Rule of
48.
Interpretation in Auto-Interpretation: The Case of "InalienableRight" in NPT Article
IV, 52 JAP. Y.B. INT'L L. 35, 42 (2010).
See infra notes 58-60.
49.
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A recent protocol to a maritime security treaty, which
criminalizes the unlawful carriage of nuclear-weapons-related
materials on the high seas, provides additional insight into how to
define proliferation activities. The Protocol to the Convention for the
Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime
Navigation (SUA Protocol) was concluded in 2005 at the International
Maritime Organization and entered into force on July 28, 2010.50 In
its relevant provisions, the SUA Protocol criminalizes (1) the
transport of any explosive or radioactive material, knowing that is
intended to be used to cause death or injury; 5 1 (2) any biological
chemical, or nuclear (BCN) weapon; 52 (3) any source material or
special fissionable material, knowing that it is intended to be used in
a nuclear explosive activity or any other activity not under IAEA
safeguards; 53 and (4) "any equipment, materials or software or
related technology that significantly contributes to the design,
manufacture or delivery of a BCN weapon, with the intention that it
will be used for such purpose. '' 54 The protocol builds on the work of
the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and bilateral shipboarding
agreements in defining proliferation in the context of international
55
transport.
Measures to prevent proliferation typically target activities
related to the possibility of proliferation, also known as "proliferationsensitive" activities. The legal treatment of such activities is not
clearly outlined in the NPT, but is arguably critical to resolving
potential inconsistencies between rights of peaceful use and
prohibitions against weapons development. The term "sensitive
nuclear activity" arose in the context of efforts in the 1970s to limit
the spread of nuclear weapons. 56 It was defined in the United States
Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1978 as "[A]ny information ... which
is not available to the public and which is important to the design,
construction, fabrication, operation or maintenance of a uranium

50.
See SUA Protocol, supra note 31; 2005 SUA Protocols to Enter into Force,
IMO NEWS (Int'l Maritime Org., London, U.K.), no. 2, 2010, at 6.
51.
SUA Protocol, supra note 31, art. 3bis(1)(b)(i).
52.
Id. art. 3bis(1)(b)(ii).
53.
Id. art. 3bis(1)(b)(iii).
54.
Id. art. 3bis(1)(b)(iv).
55.
The Statement of Interdiction Principles of the PSI refers to proliferation
"through (1) efforts to develop or acquire chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons and
associated delivery systems; or (2) transfers (either selling, receiving, or facilitating) of
WMD, their delivery systems, or related materials." Proliferation Security Initiative:
Statement of Interdiction Principles, U.S. DEP'T ST. (Sept. 23, 2003),
http://www.state.gov/t/isn/c27726.htm.
Many bilateral ship-boarding agreements
contain similar provisions in referring to "proliferation by sea." See generally Douglas
Guilfoyle, Maritime Interdiction of Weapons of Mass Destruction, 12 J. CONFLICT &
SECURITY L. 1, 23 (2007) (defining "proliferation by sea" and describing its application).
56.
For a discussion of the historical background, see Zhang Xinjun, supra note
48, at 40-43.
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enrichment or nuclear fuel reprocessing facility or a facility for the
'57
production of heavy water.
Addressing the risks posed by proliferation-sensitive activities is
a principal concern of nonproliferation legal frameworks, including
the JAEA, the Security Council, multilateral export groups, and
states. The gravity of the risk of nuclear weapons proliferation
undergirds the system of strict controls for nuclear technology and
the context-dependent nature of defining proliferation. Continuing
debates relating to the rights of non-nuclear-weapon states to engage
in proliferation-sensitive activities have provided ample fodder for
international controversies and allegations of selective targeting of
developing states for the application of preventive measures. 58
Balancing rights to peaceful use with the proliferation concerns posed
by sensitive activities is, in the end, a question of whether those
59
activities are adequately safeguarded.
Striking a balance between rights and risks under the NPT
requires recognition of the overarching norm governing the Treaty:
the prevention of proliferation. According to a statement of principles
issued by the UN General Assembly in the NPT drafting process, it
was envisioned that the Treaty "should be void of any loop-holes
which might permit nuclear or non-nuclear Powers to proliferate,
directly or indirectly, nuclear weapons in any form. ' 60 The IAEA,
operating through its safeguards system, and related enforcement
entities bear substantial responsibility for ensuring that the peaceful
uses under the Treaty do not allow the exploitation of loopholes to
61
facilitate the development of weapons.

57.
Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-242, § 4(a)(6), 92 Stat.
120 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 22 and 42 U.S.C. (2006)).
58.
See Jon B. Wolfstahl, The Nuclear Third Rail: Can Fuel Cycle Capabilities
Be Limited?, ARMS CONTROL TODAY, Dec. 2004, at 11 ("[Tlhe third rail [of the nuclear
security world] has been the nuclear fuel cycle, that is, what restrictions if any should
be placed on the ability of states to produce and use fissile materials (enriched uranium
and especially plutonium), which have civilian purposes but also can be used to make
nuclear weapons.").
59.
As Xinjun notes, the Director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency in 1968 stated that items that would now be considered proliferation-sensitive
would not be precluded under Article II of the NPT, so long as those activities are
safeguarded from abuse. Zhang Xinjun, supra note 48, at 45; see also SUBCOMM. ON
DISARMAMENT, S. COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 90TH CONG., STATUS OF
DEVELOPMENT OF BALLISTIC AND ANTI-BALLISTIC SYSTEMS IN U.S., AND BRIEFING ON

NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY (Comm. Print 1968) (statement by John S. Foster, Jr.,
Dir., Defense, Research & Eng'g, Dep't of Defense) (emphasizing the importance of
safeguards in nuclear trade).
60.
G.A. Res. 2028 (XX), 2(a), U.N. Doc. A/6014 (Nov. 19, 1965).
61.

See generally IAEA SAFEGUARDS SYSTEM, supra note 5,

12 (discussing

function of the safeguards system to ensure that nuclear materials are not diverted
from peaceful uses).
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SYSTEM: A FRAMEWORK

FOR PEACEFUL USES

The most
nonproliferation

basic preventive mechanism in the global
regime is the IAEA safeguards system. The

safeguards system consists of agreements and practices that enable
the IAEA to gain a clear picture of a state's nuclear activities and to
determine whether those activities pose risks of nuclear weapons
proliferation. Under the NPT, non-nuclear-weapons states agree to
accept safeguards comprehensively "on all source or special
fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the
territory of such State, under its jurisdiction, or carried out under its
control anywhere. '6 2 In the NPT context, the IAEA safeguards system
constitutes both the start point and end point for the verification that
a state's nuclear energy program is used for peaceful purposes. 63 The
success of the global nonproliferation regime thus depends entirely on
a functional, globally applicable, and effective monitoring and
verification system.
When state cooperation with the IAEA proves less than perfect,
the agency faces challenges in verifying the peaceful nature of
nuclear activities. As the IAEA adapts the safeguards system to meet
the challenge's of a constantly changing technological and political
landscape, states may challenge the applicability of new reporting
and inspection requirements to their programs. States wishing to
develop nuclear weapons may also seek to shield certain
weaponization activities in conventional weapons programs that are
not subject to safeguards. This in turn poses questions concerning
access to information about those activities and what standards apply
in assessing that information. Finally, gaining a clear view of a
state's nuclear activities requires an analytical framework that can
be utilized consistently across a broad range of circumstances.
A. Comprehensive SafeguardsAgreements
Comprehensive safeguards agreements (CSAs) are the principal
means by which the IAEA is able to provide credible assurances that

62.
NPT, supra note 3, art. 111(1).
63.
It should be noted that the IAEA does not possess direct authority to
address matters of compliance or noncompliance with the NPT. Primary responsibility
for interpretation of the NPT rests principally with the NPT Review Conference. See id.
art. VIII(3) (stating that the review conference will meet once every five years to assess
whether the "purposes of the Preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are being
realized"). However, to the extent that the IAEA has authority to determine compliance
with CSAs, and to the extent those CSAs are required by the NPT, the IAEA does have
legal authority to interpret whether a state is complying with safeguards aspects of its
NPT obligations.
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nuclear material is not diverted to military uses. 64 Article 3 of the
NPT requires states to conclude safeguards agreements "in
accordance with the Statute of the [IAEA] and the Agency's
safeguards system." 65 The Agency's statute contemplates the
possibility of broad safeguards authorities, including facility design
approval authority and anytimetanywhere inspections access, 66
although the safeguards agreements themselves are more limited in
scope. The standard agreement for comprehensive safeguards was
promulgated in 1972 under the IAEA's INFCIRC/153. 67 Although the
principal focus of INFCIRC/153 relates to verification of the
nondiversion of nuclear material to nuclear weapons or other nuclear
explosive devices, this authority also extends to verifying the absence
68
of undeclared activities and facilities.
INFCIRC/153 requires states to maintain an accounting system
for nuclear materials, share design plans of facilities, and allow onsite inspections and surveillance. Further details relating to material
accountancy, access specifications, reporting of nuclear facility
designs, and notice periods for new facilities are specified in
Subsidiary Arrangements concluded pursuant to the CSAs. 69 Under
the safeguards system, IAEA inspectors verify state compliance and
report instances of noncompliance to the Director General, who then
reports to the Board of Governors. 70 The Board may in turn require
remedial action, 71 order special (nonroutine) inspections, 72 and report
noncompliance to the Security Council. 73 In this respect, the IAEA
safeguards system provides a basic procedural framework for

64.
See IAEA SAFEGUARDS SYSTEM, supra note 5,
1 (describing the purpose
and functions of CSAs).
65.
NPT, supra note 3, art. III.
66.
IAEA Statute, supra note 9, art. XII(A)(1), (6).
67.
IAEA, The Structure and Content of Agreements Between the Agency and
States Required in Connection with the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear
Weapons, IAEA Doc. INFCIRC/153(Corrected) (June 1972).
68.
Id. 2; see also GOV/OR.864, 49, cited in IAEA Dir. Gen., Implementation
of the NPT Safeguards. Agreement and Relevant Provisions of Security Council
Resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran, 52, n.42, IAEA Doc. GOV/2011/65 (Nov. 8,
2011) (confirming that the Agency's responsibilities for ensuring the completeness and
correctness of safeguards reports under paragraph 2 of INFCIRC/153 extend to both
the verification of nondiversion and the absence of undeclared facilities).
69.
See, e.g., IAEA Doc. INFCIRC/153(Corrected), supra note 67,
31, 42, 46,
51, 64(b), 65, 68, 75(d)(e), 76(a), 90 (providing express legal authority for cited actions).
70.
IAEA Statute, supra note 9, art. XII(C).
71.
See IAEA Doc. INFCIRC/153(Corrected), supra note 67,
18 (declaring the
Board's power to "call upon the State to take the required action without delay"). .
72.
The Agency may request special inspections without Board approval,
although the Board may request special inspections under its authority to require
remedial action under paragraph 18. See id.
73, 77 (outlining the scope of
inspections).
73.
IAEA
Statute, supra
note
9,
art.
XII(C);
LAEA
Doc.
INFCIRC/153(Corrected), supranote 67, 19.
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Security Council nonproliferation enforcement measures. As far as
IAEA authorities are concerned, the Board has authority to suspend
assistance to a state, call for the return of materials and equipment,
74
and suspend rights of membership.
B. The Model Additional Protocol
Problems in the effectiveness of the safeguards system became
painfully clear in 1991, when it was revealed that Iraq had been
conducting extensive clandestine nuclear weapons activities at
locations immediately adjacent to safeguarded facilities. 75 In response
to this revelation, the Board of Governors adopted INFCIRC/540, a
"Model Additional Protocol" 76 to the safeguards agreements. The
Additional Protocol provides expanded authorities aimed at the
detection of undeclared activities and materials in order to verify the
completeness of state declarations. The protocol extends reporting
and inspection requirements to all aspects of the fuel cycle, including
uranium mining, as well as research and development activities not
involving nuclear material. 77 It also provides for "complementary
access" by the Agency outside of the framework of routine inspections
in order to verify the absence of undeclared materials or activities in
the event that questions or inconsistencies arise. 78 The Additional
Protocol and the CSAs are meant to operate synergistically as
"integrated safeguards" in order to provide a comprehensive
understanding of nuclear activities at the state level. 79 The IAEA's

74.
IAEA Statute, supra note 9, art. XII(C).
75.
See U.N. Secretary General, Consolidated Report on the First Two LAEA
Inspections Under Security Council Resolution 687 (1991) of IraqiNuclear Capabilities,
at 10-11, U.N. Doc. S/22788 (July 15, 1991) (describing noncompliant Iraqi nuclear
facilities).
76.
See IAEA, Model Protocol Additional to the Agreement(s) Between State(s)
and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards, pmbl.
para. 2, IAEA Doc. INFCIRC/540 (Sept. 1997) ("[T]he desire of the international
community to further enhance nuclear non-proliferation by strengthening the
effectiveness and improving the efficiency of the Agency's safeguards system.").
77.
Id. arts. 2, 4-5.
78.
Id. arts. 4-5; see also IAEA, VERIFYING COMPLIANCE WITH NUCLEAR
NONPROLIFERATION

UNDERTAKINGS

10

(2011),

available at

http://www.iaea.org/

Publications/Booklets/Safeguards3/safeguardsO4O8.pdf
(describing
the
use
of
"complementary access" as a tool "to help verify the absence of undeclared nuclear
material and related activities and the decommissioned status of facilities").
79.
Id. at 7; see also Laura Rockwood, The IAEA's Strengthened Safeguards
System, 7 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 123, 135 (2002) ("The concept of 'integrated
safeguards' includes, inter alia, a 'state-level', rather than 'facility-level', approach
through which the Agency will seek to develop a comprehensive understanding of a
state's nuclear activities and plans with a view to enabling it to draw safeguards
conclusions about the completeness and correctnessof states' declarations.").
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overall analytical approach under safeguards is known as the "statelevel concept."8 0
The Model Additional Protocol is intended to apply universally to
both NWS and NNWS, but has not thus far been treated as
mandatory under international practice. 81 Insofar as the NPT
requires the conclusion of safeguards in accordance with the IAEA's
safeguards system, the Agency arguably has some discretion to
declare that the Additional Protocol is part of that system.8 2 Such a
determination by the IAEA may be controversial in view of the
inability of the NPT states parties to agree that the protocol is
mandatory under the NPT, but may yet occur as the protocol gains
further acceptance. It may also be argued that the Agency or the
Security Council has authority to require the conclusion of an
additional protocol as a corrective measure to remedy a serious case
of noncompliance under INFCIRC/153 (and Article 12.C of the
Statute), although the Agency has not to date advanced this position.
The Security Council has called on states to ratify the Additional
83
Protocol, yet has stopped short of considering this a requirement.
States that have either developed nuclear weapons while under
safeguards or engaged in suspect activities did not agree to the
enhanced safeguards under the Additional Protocol. These states
84
include North Korea, Iraq, Iran, and Syria.

See, e.g., IAEA, SAFEGUARDS STATEMENT FOR 2010 48 (2010), available at
80.
IAEA
SAFEGUARDS
http://www.iaea.org/OurWork/SV/Safeguards/es/es2OlO.html;
23.
SYSTEM, supra note 5,
81.
As of June 21, 2011, 96 of the 185 NPT parties have brought an Additional
Protocol into force and another 44 have either signed or signaled approval of one.
Status List: Conclusion of Safeguards Agreements, Additional Protocols and Small
Quantities Protocols, IAEA, http://www.iaea.org/OurWork/SV/Safeguards/documents/
sir-table.pdf (last updated Feb. 20, 2012). See generally Masahiko Asada, The Treaty
on the Nonproliferationof Nuclear Weapons and the Universalizationof the Additional
Protocol, 16 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 3 (2011) (discussing the historical background
and principal legal arguments for and against the obligatory character of -the
Additional Protocol).
82.
But see Asada, supra note 81, at 8-9 (arguing that NPT parties are not
legally bound under the NPT by sua sponte IAEA changes to safeguards system): While
the IAEA has the authority to determine what constitutes its safeguards system, the
author recognizes that its authority, does not generally extend to providing
interpretations of the NPT.
83.
See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1929, 5, U.N. Doc. S[RES/1929 (June 9, 2010) ("[C]alls
upon Iran to act strictly in accordance with the provisions of the Additional Protocol to
its IAEA Safeguards Agreement that it signed on 18 December 2003, calls upon Iran to
ratify promptly the Additional Protocol."); S.C. Res. 1887, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1887 (Sep.
24, 2009).
84.
See infra Part III.
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C. New FacilityNotification and Code 3.1
Timely notification of new facilities is important to allow the
IAEA to review design plans and to integrate those facilities into its
3.1 of the original Subsidiary
safeguards analysis. Code
Arrangements required notification of new facilities to the IAEA 180
days prior to the introduction of nuclear material at that facility. The
Agency later modified this notice provision to require reporting as
soon as the decision to construct or authorize construction of a new
facility is taken.8 5 The IAEA faces verification hurdles when states
fail to abide by this requirement, and such a failure may raise
adverse inferences about a state's intentions.
Iran contested the binding character of the modified notice
requirement in 2009 after a secret enrichment facility was revealed at
Qom. Iran claimed at the time that it had suspended its
implementation of modified Code 3.1 in March 200786 because of
"illegal Security Council resolutions. '81 It argued that it was legally
bound only by the previous notice requirement.88 The IAEA rejected
the argument that Iran could voluntarily suspend the notice
requirement, noting that Iran "remains the only State with
significant nuclear activities which has a comprehensive safeguards
agreement in force that is not implementing the provisions of
modified Code 3.1."89 The Security Council later endorsed the IAEA's
interpretation that the modified notice requirement of Code 3.1 was
legally binding and mandatory. 90 Although the modified Code 3.1 is

85.
See Pierre Goldschmidt, Deputy Dir. Gen., IAEA, Statement at the JNC
International Forum for Peaceful Utilization of Nuclear Energy: Present Status and
Future of International Safeguards, para. 13 (Feb. 12, 2003), available at
http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/statements/ddgs/2003/goldschmidtl2022003.html
("The Agency has also strengthened its implementation of design information
examination and verification. States have been asked to accept an amendment to the
General Part of their Subsidiary Arrangements (Code 3.1) to more explicitly reflect the
State's obligation to provide design information for new facilities at a very early
stage.").
86.
See IAEA, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and Relevant
Provisions of Security Council Resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran: Rep. by the
DirectorGeneral, 12, IAEA Doc. GOV/2007/22 (June 14, 2007).
87.
IAEA, Communication Dated 3 December 2009 Received from the
Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the Agency Concerning Statements
Made by the Islamic Republic of Iran in the Board of Governors, at 2,.IAEA Doc.
INFCIRC/779 (Dec. 7, 2009).
88.
Id.
89.
IAEA Dir. Gen., Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and
Relevant Provisions of Security Council Resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803
(2008)and 1835 (2008) in the Islamic Republic of Iran, 30, IAEA Doc. GOV/2010/28
(June 10, 2010).
90.
See S.C. Res. 1803, at 1-2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1803 (Mar. 3, 2008)
("[E]mphasizing that in accordance with Article 39 of Iran's Safeguards Agreement
Code 3.1 cannot be modified nor suspended unilaterally and that the Agency's right to
verify design information provided to it is a continuing right, which is not dependent on
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now well-established as an integral part of the safeguards system,
failure to comply with this provision allows for more rapid movement
toward threshold capacity without allowing sufficient time for Agency
assessment.
D. Weaponization Activities Not Involving Nuclear Material
Another challenge for the IAEA lies in the task of applying
safeguards to undeclared activities that do not involve nuclear
material. Nuclear weapons development activities that do not involve
the actual use of nuclear material-such as the engineering of
nuclear weapons delivery systems in locations where nuclear
material has not yet been introduced-present a particular concern.
When such concerns arise, the IAEA has the legal authority to
address those concerns on the basis of reporting requirements and
special inspections. The Model Additional Protocol expands these
authorities through an enhanced inspections regime.
Reporting requirements under comprehensive safeguards
agreements allow the IAEA to seek amplifications or clarifications for
the purpose of verifying that nuclear material is not diverted to
nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices.9 1 If the IAEA concludes
that information made available by the state is inadequate to allow
the IAEA to fulfill its verification responsibilities, it may order special
inspections extending to locations outside of those designated for
routine inspections. 92 Under the INFCIRC/153 regime, the Board
may require remedial action when doubts arise as to the diversion of
nuclear material to nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices.9 3
Finally, the stated objective of safeguards under INFCIRC/153 (Corr.)
is the timely detection of the diversion of nuclear material from
peaceful nuclear activities to the manufacture of nuclear weapons or
other nuclear explosive devices. 4 Without the ability to consider
evidence of weapons development activities prior to the actual
completion of the process, timely detection would not be possible.
The Model Additional Protocol is more robust in permitting the
IAEA to investigate potential weapons development activities not
involving the use of nuclear material. The Additional Protocol

see
");
the stage of construction of, or the presence of nuclear material at, a facility ....
also S.C. Res. 1929, supra note 83, 7 5 ("[C]alls upon Iran to ratify promptly the
Additional Protocol, and reaffirms that, in accordance with Articles 24 and 39 of Iran's
Safeguards Agreement, Iran's Safeguards Agreement and its Subsidiary Arrangement,
including modified Code 3.1, cannot be amended or changed unilaterally by Iran, and
notes that there is no mechanism in the Agreement for the suspension of any of the
provisions in the Subsidiary Arrangement ...").
91.
IAEA SAFEGUARDS SYSTEM, supra note 5, 7 2, 69.
92.
Id. 73.
93.
Id. $T 18-19.
94.'
Id. 28.
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expressly extends reporting requirements to research and
development activities that do not involve nuclear material. 95 It also
provides for enhanced "complementary access" by the IAEA outside of
the framework of routine inspections in the event that questions or
inconsistencies arise. 96 In addition to the comprehensive safeguards
model agreement documents, the item-specific safeguards regime that
provided the foundation for the comprehensive regime (as well as the
IAEA Statute) supports the proposition that safeguards may be
applied to activities not involving the use of nuclear materials,
including nuclear weapons development activities. 97 A failure to
development activity cannot
declare nuclear-weapons-related
properly shield a state from inspections in this context, as safeguards
obligations extend to materials and activities that are required to be
reported, as well as those that are in fact reported. 98 .
E. Assessing the Credibility of Information Sources
Obtaining information relating to clandestine activities may be
one of the greatest challenges facing the Agency. In doing so, it must
often rely on intelligence from member states. 99 Verifying the
credibility of those sources requires that the Agency maintain the
capacity to analyze and corroborate intelligence. In practice, the
Agency has required corroboration from multiple sources and other
indicia of reliability before it raises concerns about an activity.' 00

95.
IAEA Doe. INFCIRC/540, supra note 76, art. 2(a)(i) (specifying that
member states shall provide "[a] general description of and information specifying the
location of nuclear fuel cycle-related research and development activities not involving
nuclearmaterial .... ").
96.
Id. arts. 4-5. See generally IAEA, supra note 78, at 10 (explaining
complimentary access may be used in "[cases of questions or inconsistencies").
97.
See generally George Bunn, How Far Can Inspectors Go?, IAEA BULL.,
Mar. 2007, at 50 (arguing that the INFCIRC/66/Rev.2 safeguards system, in place at
the time the term "safeguards system" was incorporated into the NPT, provided for the
application of safeguards to activities not involving nuclear material); DeFrancia,
supra note 7, at 37-38 (expanding on Bunn's argument and discussing support in the
IAEA Statute for the general application of safeguards to activities in which nuclear
material is not present).
98.
See Rockwood, supra note 79, at 123 ("The Agency's obligation is not
limited to nuclear material and facilities actually declared by a state; it also extends to
that which is required to be declared.").
99.
Members may make available to the Agency "such information as would,
the judgment of the member, be helpful to the Agency." IAEA Statute, supra note 9,
art. VIII(A).
In the case of Iran, discussed infra Part III, the IAEA initially expressed
100.
some frustration at its "limited means to authenticate [documentation provided by
states] independently" and "constraints placed by some Member States on the
availability of information," yet based on further study and corroboration of those
inputs produced was able to ascertain the credibility of the sources. See IAEA Doc.
16; IAEA, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards
GOV/2011/65, supra note 68,
Agreement and Relevant Provisions of Security Council Resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747
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Tools used to assess credibility include critical analysis of the
information provided, corroboration from member states, independent
verification, and contact with sources.10 1 When sufficient detail exists
on weapons development activities, the Director General may
incorporate that information into its reports to the Board of
Governors to facilitate consideration of what remedial or enforcement
0 2
steps, if any, may be appropriate.1
F. The Analytical Framework
The development of a consistent analytical framework for
proliferation risk assessment is critical to the task of implementing
safeguards in a state-specific yet nondiscriminatory fashion. 103
Factors that indicate heightened levels of proliferation risk vary from
state to state, requiring variable approaches to safeguards
implementation. Accommodating the need for customization in a
structured framework requires a degree of consistency in the criteria
that guide assessments across a broad range of circumstances. In
order to facilitate customization, specific criteria may be advanced to
mirror factors that have evolved through practice as potential
indicators of proliferation risk. These factors may include deception,
ambiguity, hedging behavior, noncooperation, suspect rhetoric, and
pursuit of unnecessary dual-use technologies.10 4 A useful model for
the Agency may be found in the risk-factors approach applied under
financial reporting regulations, in which lawyers and accountants
work together with public corporations to provide a transparent
account of fundamental risks facing those enterprises for the benefit
of investors. 0 5

(2007), 1803 (2008), and 1835 (2008) in the Islamic Republic of Iran, 19, IAEA Doc.
GOV/2009/55 (Aug. 28, 2009).
12-16.
101.
IAEA Doc. GOV/2011/65, supra note 68,
102.
See, e.g., id.
103.
See generally Herman Nackaerts, A Changing Landscape: Preparingfor
Future Verification Challenges, Statements of the Deputy Director General, IAEA (Feb.
2, 2011), http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/statements/ddgs/2011/nackaertsO2O211.html
(discussing the Agency's move toward a customized approach to safeguards
implementation while reaffirming the need to apply safeguards in a fair and
nondiscriminatory manner).
104.
See supraPart III (discussing the IAEA Safeguards system).
105.
17 C.F.R. § 229.503(c) (2012); Directive 2003/71/EC of the European
Parliament and of the Council on the Prospectus to be Published When Securities Are
Offered to the Public or Admitted to Trading and Amending Directive 2001/34/EC,
2003 O.J. (L 345), 64-89; see, e.g., INT'L ORG. OF SEC. COMM'NS, INTERNATIONAL
DISCLOSURE STANDARDS FOR CROSS-BORDER OFFERINGS AND INITIAL LISTINGS BY

FOREIGN ISSUERS (1998), available at http://www.sec.gov/about/offices/oia/oiacorpfinlcrossborder.pdf (explaining the disclosure standards recommended by the
International Organization of Securities Commissions).
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Key indicators of risk already guide the practice of the IAEA in
analyzing nuclear activities at the state level. The IAEA has
traditionally employed technical and analytical methods based on
possible "diversion paths" to assess whether nuclear material has
been diverted to military uses. 106 In a recent report on alleged
Iranian nuclear weapons development activities, the Agency disclosed
that its analysis was based on "a structured and systematic approach
to information analysis which the Agency uses in its evaluation of
safeguards implementation." 107 This approach involves inter alia,
"relevant indicators of the existence or development of processes
associated
with
nuclear-related
activities,
including
weaponization." 108 The report elaborated in detail on technical
indicators of nuclear weapons development. 1 0 9 The Agency further
noted a behavioral pattern of late or after-the-fact acknowledgement
of the existence of previously undeclared components of the program
that tended to increase its concerns about Iran's activities.11 0 This
report signals the evolution of customizable criteria for risk analysis
within a structured analytical framework that is both fair and
effective. Further work in this area will serve to ensure that
safeguards continue to hold promise as the principal mechanism to
ensure that nuclear materials remain in peaceful uses.
G. Assessing Capabilities:Technology and Intention
An assessment of -both capability and intention to acquire
nuclear weapons requires distinctions of different steps in the
process. The making of a nuclear weapon is said to take place in three
basic stages. 111 First is the production of the nuclear (fissile)
material, said to be the most difficult of the stages. "1 2 Weapons-grade
fissile material may be obtained from highly enriched uranium

106.
For discussion of LAEA analytical methods, see IAEA SAFEGUARDS SYSTEM,
supra note 5,
23; IAEA, IAEA Safeguards Implementation at Nuclear Fuel Cycle
Facilities, at 25, IAEA Doc. SG/INF/6 (Jan. 1985) (providing examples of simplified
diversion paths).
107.
IAEA Doc. GOV2011165, supra note 68, 41.
108.
Id. Annex, para. 1.
109.
These indicators appear to be a component of a methodology based on the
"physical model" of the nuclear fuel cycle that "identifies, describes and characterizes
every known technical process for converting source material to weapon usable
material and identifies indicators for each process in terms of equipment, nuclear
material and non-nuclear material." IAEA SAFEGUARDS SYSTEM, supranote 5, 25.
110.
IAEA Doc. GOV/2011/65, supra note 68, Annex, 15.
111.
RANDALL FORSBERG ET AL., NONPROLIFERATION PRIMER: PREVENTING THE
SPREAD OF NUCLEAR, CHEMICAL, AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS 43 (1996).
112.
HANNE BREIVIK, NORWEGIAN DEF. RESEARCH ESTABLISHMENT, REP. No.
00490, HIGHLY ENRICHED URANIUM AND CRUDE NUCLEAR WEAPONS 12 (2008),

available at http://www.7ni.mfa.no/NR/rdonlyres/155FOB5AlF6147F1928224E87AF6A
005/103634/FFIReportHEUandCrudeNuclearWeaponsl.PDF.
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(HEU)-uranium "enriched" to increase the ratio of U-235 to U238113-before it is fed into reactors, or from plutonium extracted
from spent fuel rods at the back end of the process. Plutonium is a
byproduct of the exposure to neutrons of an isotope of uranium (U238) in the operation of nuclear reactors, isolated in reprocessing of
114
spent fuel rods after they have been .discharged from a reactor.
Low-enriched uranium (LEU), which is enriched at 3-5 percent, may
be converted to HEU, which is enriched to 20 percent or more. HEU
may be used for nuclear weapons (when enriched to 90 percent), as
well as for certain civilian uses, including as fuel for research reactors
115
and for the production of radioisotopes used in nuclear medicine.
The second stage is the introduction of additional components,
such as chemical explosives, triggers, detonators, and circuitry, in
order to initiate and sustain an explosive chain reaction. 116 The third
stage is to integrate the explosive device witha delivery system, such
as a ballistic missile. 117 In the area of missile development and
delivery systems, the acquisition of sovereign defensive missile
capabilities is not generally prohibited under international law'1 8
(although the multilateral Missile Technology Control Regime
encourages export restrictions on missile technology). 119 Potential
indicators in the weapons development process are the possession of
weapons-grade fissile material, and possession of weapons
technologies specific to the development of a nuclear explosive.
Capability in these three arenas implies a threshold status that
may allow a state to abrogate its treaty obligations in a "breakout
scenario" and proceed to rapidly develop nuclear weapons. 1 20 The
problem of threshold nuclear-weapons states is not new, 12 1 but has
not yet been solved as a legal matter. Iraq, Libya, and North Korea
each operated under the safeguards system while developing nuclear

113.
U-235 and U-238 are two isotopes found in uranium ore. Approximately 0.7
percent of uranium ore is U-235, while 99.3 percent is U-238. FORSBERG ET AL., supra
note 111, at 40-43.
114.
Id.
115.
116.

BREIVIK, supra note 112, at 8.
FORSBERG ETAL., supra note 111, at 43.

117.

Id. at 44.

118.
119.

See JOYNER, supra note 41, at 41.
MISSILE TECH. CONTROL REGIME, http://www.mtcr.info (last visited Apr. 1,

2012).
120.
The term "breakout scenario," common in contemporary debates on
proliferation, was used in the context of debates over the SALT I & II and START arms
control treaties to refer to the reassembly and deployment of retired weapons. See
David A. Koplow, How Do We Get Rid of These Things?: DismantlingExcess Weapons
While Protecting the Environment, 89 NW. U. L. REV. 445, 453 n.28 (1995) (referring to
SALT I & II and START for the term "breakout scenario).
See, e.g., Mohamed A. Shaker, Remarks at the American Society of
121.
International Law Proceedings on Nuclear Nonproliferation-Law and Policy (Apr. 22,
1982), in 76 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 77, 86 (1984) (discussing the problem of
"threshold states").
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weapons programs. As a state approaches threshold status, a
noncooperative stance toward the IAEA may raise serious
proliferation concerns, meriting enhanced study to ensure full
compliance with nonproliferation obligations.

IV. PROLIFERATION QUANDARIES: PROMINENT CASE STUDIES

Notorious recent cases of alleged noncompliance with the NPT
and related nonproliferation norms involve North Korea, Iran, and
Syria. In each of these cases measures were imposed, through the
Security Council or through multilateral and unilateral action, with
varying results. Assessing what measures may be appropriate
requires a consideration of the risks the activities in question pose for
the proliferation of nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices.
Assessing these risks involves a range of factors and identifiable
patterns of behavior that may indicate a high risk of proliferation.
These factors include deception, ambiguity (programs that could
either be peaceful or military), pursuit of unnecessary technologies,
noncooperation, minimalist compliance, and political statements
indicative of an intention to develop weapons. Additional risk factors
from the peace and security standpoint may involve political
instability, hostile relations, connections to non-state terrorist groups,
poor governance, and the use of threats potentially connected to the
use of nuclear weapons. These factors could explain why some states
that have rather sophisticated fuel cycle capabilities, such as Japan
and Argentina, are not commonly considered to be a proliferation
risk 122 while others may attract significant international attention.
The following case studies illustrate the dilemmas of preventing
proliferation under the NPT framework, including practices relating
to prevention of proliferation, enforcement of nonproliferation
obligations, and possible paths toward diplomatic solutions.
A. North Korea: Moving Beyond the Threshold
North Korea's nuclear program began in the 1960s and 1960s
with Soviet assistance and fuel input. 123 North Korea became a

122.
See Argentina Country Profile: Overview, NUCLEAR THREAT INITIATIVE
(Dec. 1, 2011), http://www.nti.org/country-profiles/argentina (discussing dismantling of
Argentina's military nuclear program); Peter Cuznik, Japan's Nuclear History in
Perspective: Eisenhower and Atoms for War and Peace, BULL. ATOMIC SCIENTISTS (Apr.
13, 2011), http://thebulletin.org/web-edition/features/japans-nuclear-history-perspectiveeisenhower-and-atoms-war-and-peace (discussing Japan's anti-nuclear weapons posture).
123.
See Press Release, IAEA, Fact Sheet on DPRK Nuclear Safeguards, IAEA
Media Advisory No. 2002/52 (Dec. 11, 2002) [hereinafter IAEA North Korea Factsheet],
available at http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/focus/iaeadprk/fact-sheet-may2003.shtml.
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member of the IAEA in 1974 (and withdrew in 1994),124 but did not
join the NPT until 1985.125 In the 1980s, it developed indigenous fuel
cycle capabilities with the construction of new reactors, reprocessing
facilities, and a fuel rod fabrication plant at Nyongbyong. 1 26 When
the IAEA conducted inspections under safeguards in the early 1990s,
it was unable to verify aspects of North Korea's nuclear program, in
particular its fuel reprocessing activities and the amount of
plutonium that had been separated from the spent fuel. 127 The
IAEA's initial inspections gave indications of a history that included
several reprocessing operations, although North Korea only admitted
to one. 128 North Korea refused special inspections that would have
allowed the IAEA to verify whether nuclear materials had been
diverted, and in 1994, it discharged the spent fuel in a manner that
made a historical analysis of the reactor core impossible. 129 After
many years of noncooperation and unsuccessful negotiations, North
Korea eventually extracted and diverted enough plutonium from its
130
reprocessing activities to develop nuclear weapons.
The relevant legal aspects of North Korea's nuclear weapons
development are as follows. In 1992, North Korea and South Korea
signed a Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean
Peninsula, which required the parties to forego reprocessing and
enrichment. 131 However, the parties failed to agree on its
implementation. 1 32 North Korea signed a safeguards agreement in
1992 and inspections took place that same year. 133 After the
inspections process broke down, North Korea announced on March
12, 1993, that it intended to withdraw from the NPT, citing its
"supreme state interest[ ]" under Article 10 of the Treaty and its

124.
Member States of the IAEA, IAEA, http://www.iaea.org/About/Policy/
MemberStates (last visited Apr. 1, 2012).
125.
See IAEA North Korea Factsheet, supra note 123.
126.

Id.;

North

Korea

Profile:

Nuclear,

NUCLEAR

THREAT

INITIATIVE,

http://www.nti.org/country-profiles/north-korea (last updated Mar. 2012).
127.
IAEA Dir. Gen., Implementation of the Safeguards Agreement Between the
Agency and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea Pursuant to the Treaty on the
Non-proliferationof Nuclear Weapons, 14, IAEA Doc. GC(47)/19 (Aug. 13, 2003).
128.
IAEA, THE DPRK's VIOLATION OF ITS NPT SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT WITH
THE IAEA 1 (1997) [hereinafter IAEA NORTH KOREA HISTORY], available at
http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/focus/iaeadprk/dprk.pdf ("[North Korea] maintained
that this plutonium was all that they had separated, and that they had conducted only
a single reprocessing operation, or 'campaign', in 1990. The IAEA's analyses showed,
however, that there had been several reprocessing campaigns. This implied that the
DPRK had separated more plutonium than it had stated in its Initial Report.").
129.
Id. at 2.
130.
See IAEA North Korea Factsheet, supra note 123.
Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula,
131.
N. Kor.-S. Kor., Jan. 20, 1992, available at http://www.nti.org/e-research/officialdocs/
inventory/pdfs/aptkoreanuc.pdf.
132.
North Korea Profile: Nuclear, supra note 126.
133.

IAEA NORTH KOREA HISTORY, supra note 128, at 1.
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"unique status," which it claimed was related to the threats it faced
from South Korea and the United States. 134 In Resolution 825,
responding to the withdrawal, the Security Council did not go so far
as to deny North Korea's right to withdraw, but urged it to return to
the Treaty and decided to remain seized of the matter. 135 On June 11,
1993, one day before the withdrawal was to take effect, North Korea
1 36
"suspended" its withdrawal in order to continue negotiations.
Prompted by a 1994 visit by Jimmy Carter, North Korea
consented to an "Agreed Framework" with the United States as a
basis for continuing negotiations. 13 7 Under the Agreed Framework,
North Korea would remain a party to the NPT, inspections would
resume, and it would take steps to implement the Joint Declaration.
In turn, the United States would provide a negative security
assurance, supply an alternative source of fuel (oil), and lead a
consortium to build two light water reactors (LWR), 138 which are less
suitable to plutonium production than the graphite-moderated
reactors at Yongbyong. 139 At the request of the Security Council and
pursuant to the Agreed Framework, the IAEA was tasked to monitor
the freeze on enrichment and reprocessing activities, which it viewed
140
as a subset of its activities under safeguards.
The IAEA monitored the freeze from 1994 to 2002 with some
difficulties. In October 2002, North Korea revealed to a U.S.
delegation that it had an ongoing program to enrich uranium for
nuclear weapons. 141 This prompted the IAEA Board of Governors to
adopt a resolution urging compliance on January 6, 2003, which then
led to North Korea's announcement of withdrawal from the NPT,
effective January 11, 2003.142 North Korea characterized the move as
"self-defensive" and again cited its "unique status" in terms of the

134.
IAEA, Communication Dated 20 April 1994 Received from the Permanent
Mission of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to the InternationalAtomic Energy
Agency, at 1, IAEA Doc. INFCIRC/442 (May 9, 1994).
135.
S.C. Res. 825, T 5, U.N. Doc. S/RES/825 (May 11, 1993).
136.

IAEA NORTH KOREA HISTORY, supra note 128, at 2.

137.
IAEA, Agreed Framework of 21 October 1994 Between the United States of
America and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, IAEA Doc. INFCIRC/457 (Nov.
2, 1994); Micahel J. Mazarr, Going Just a Little Nuclear: NonproliferationLessons from
North Korea, 20 INT'L SECURITY 92, 96-97 (1995).
138.
IAEA Doc. INFCIRC/457, supra note 137.
139.

See generally PlutoniumProduction, FED'N AM. SCIENTISTS (June 20, 2000),

http://www.fas.org/nuke/intro/nuke/plutonium.htm ("Light-water power reactors make
fewer plutonium nuclei per uranium fission than graphite-moderated production
reactors.").
140.
See U.N. President of the S.C., Statement 1994/64, U.N. Doc.
SIPRST/1994/64 (Nov. 4, 1994).
141.
JAEA Doc. GC(47)/19, supra note 127, IT 2-3.
142.
North Korea was of the view that since it "suspended" its March 12, 1993
notification of withdrawal one day short of the three-month period provided for in
Article X(1) of the NPT, it only needed to provide one day's notice to withdraw. Id. TT
10-11.
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perceived threat from the United States, and referenced the "Team
Spirit" joint military exercises between the United States and South
Korea. 143 After faltering negotiations and the commencement of sixparty talks with North Korea, South Korea, China, Russia, Japan,
and the United States, North Korea conducted its first nuclear
weapons test in October 2006.144 The test, as well as North Korea's
withdrawal from the NPT, was condemned in Security Council
Resolution 1695. Resolution 1695 required states to exercise vigilance
"to prevent missile and missile-related items, materials, goods and
technology being transferred" to North Korea's missile or WMD
program, and further required states to prevent the procurement of
missile-related items and the transfer of any financial resources
145
involving North Korea's WMD programs.
After more faltering talks and a temporary resumption of
inspections, North Korea conducted a second nuclear test on May 25,
2009. In Resolution 1874 of June 12, 2009, the Security Council
reiterated its earlier resolutions and demanded that North Korea
return to the NPT and IAEA safeguards. 146 The resolution expanded
upon sanctions relating to military and nuclear equipment, luxury
goods, and financial assets connected to the nuclear program. Travel
restrictions were imposed on persons involved in the program, and a
committee was designated to implement and make recommendations
47
relating to the sanctions.1
The case of North Korea exhibits vulnerabilities in the NPT
safeguards system, while confirming the existence of legal
nonproliferation norms outside of the framework of the NPT. While
North Korea was initially able to signal withdrawal from the NPT
without penalty in 1993, its actual withdrawal from the Treaty and
swift acquisition of a nuclear weapon triggered a demand of the
Security Council to return to the Treaty. These events demonstrate
that exiting the Treaty does not cure noncompliance with the NPT
under broader standards of nonproliferation. 148 Neither the
negotiation framework nor the inspections system was sufficient in
this case to prevent North Korea's acquisition of nuclear weapons.

143.
North Korea Announces Withdrawal from NPT, January 10: Statement and
Reaction, ACRONYM.ORG, http://www.acronym.org.uk/docs/O3O1/docO2.htm (last visited
Apr. 1, 2012); Korean Cent. News Agency, 'DetailedReport' Explains NPT Withdrawal
(Jan. 22, 2003), http:l/www.fas.org/nukelguideldprk/nukeldprkOl2203.html.
144.
North Korea Profile: Nuclear,supra note 126.
145.
S.C. Res. 1695, 4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1695 (July 15, 2006).
146.
S.C. Res. 1874, 6, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1874 (June 12, 2009).
147.
Id.; S.C. Res. 1718, 12, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1718 (Oct. 14, 2006).
148.
In this regard, the NPT cannot be said to be a self-contained regime with
regard to the law on proliferation. See generally Bruno Simma & Dirk Pulkowski, Of
Planets and the Universe: Self-Contained Regimes in International Law, 17 EUR. J.
INT'L L. 483 (2006).
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The problem is no longer one of preventing proliferation, but one of
enforcing the prohibition on North Korea's acts of proliferation.
B. Iran: The Problem of Ambiguity
Concerns relating to possible weapons development aspects of
Iran's nuclear program relate principally to its enrichment activities.
According to the IAEA, Iran possesses advanced capabilities in nearly
all aspects of the front end of a nuclear fuel cycle, including "uranium
mining and milling, conversion, enrichment, fuel fabrication, heavy
water production, a light water reactor, a heavy water research
reactor and associated research and development facilities." 149 Its
decision to pursue enrichment capabilities was undertaken in 1985 at
a time of heightened vulnerability during its war with Iraq (during
which Iraq used chemical weapons against it).15 0 It was later revealed
that, during this time period, Iran received assistance and materials
for its enrichment program from a clandestine network run out of
Pakistan by A.Q. Khan and affiliates. 151 Documentation from those
early arrangements includes instructions involving weaponization
152
techniques and other signals of possible military dimensions.

149.
IAEA, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic
Republic of Iran: Rep. of the Director General, 45, IAEA Doc. GOV/2003/75 (Nov. 10,
2003).
150.
See Ian Black, The Legacy of Chemical Warfare, GUARDIAN (London) (Nov.
26, 2008), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/nov/26/iran-iraq-war.
151.
The IAEA has publicly confirmed that the source of components of Iran's
enrichment program and documents relating to weaponization came from Pakistan,
but specific allegations involving the Khan network are indicated through other
sources, including Khan's own statements. IAEA, Implementation of the NPT
Safeguards Agreement and Relevant Provisions of Security Council Resolutions 1737
(2006) and 1747 (2007) in the Islamic Republic of Iran: Rep. of the Director General,
11, IAEA Doc. GOV/2008/4 (Feb. 22, 2008); R. Jeffrey Smith & Joby Warrick,
PakistaniScientist Khan Describes Iranian Efforts to Buy Nuclear Bombs, WASH. POST,
Mar. 14, 2010, at A14, see also MOHAMED ELBARADEI, THE AGE OF DECEPTION:
NUCLEAR DIPLOMACY IN TREACHEROUS TIMES 167 (2011) ("The first known transaction
of the Khan network occurred in 1987, when two of Khan's associates and three
Iranians had agreed, in a meeting in Dubai, on the terms of a sale for centrifuge
components and designs.").
152.
IAEA, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and Relevant
Provisions of Security Council Resolutions 1737(2006), 1747 (2007) and 1803 (2008) in
the Islamic Republic of Iran: Rep. of the Director General,
24, IAEA Doc.
GOV/2008/15 (May 26, 2008) ("On 8 November 2007, the Agency received a copy of the
15-page document describing the procedures for the reduction of UF6 to uranium metal
and casting it into hemispheres. Iran has reiterated that this document was received
along with the P-1 centrifuge documentation in 1987."); IAEA Doc. GOV/2008/4, supra
note 151,
19; IAEA, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant
provisions of Security Council resolutions 1737 (2006) and 1747 (2007) in the Islamic
Republic of Iran: Rep. of the Director General, 25, IAEA Doc. GOV/2007/58 (Nov. 15,
2007).
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Iran's nuclear program dates back to at least 1957, when it
signed a cooperation agreement with the United States for the
peaceful uses of atomic energy. 153 The agreement put a ceiling of six
kilograms on the amount of HEU that could be in the custody of Iran
at any time via related transfers. 154 In 1960, the Atomic Energy
Organization of Iran (AEOI) established the Tehran Nuclear
Research Centre (TNRC). 155 In 1967, a 5MWt research reactor was
constructed at Tehran University, which was originally fueled by
small amounts of 93 percent HEU, provided from the United
States. 1 56 The reactor, known as the TRR (originally operated by
Tehran University and later under the control of AEOI), supplied
radioisotopes for nuclear medicine, among other things. 157 The
enriched uranium required to fuel the TRR continues to serve as a
capabilities, and
basis for Iran's claim to need indigenous enrichment158
debates.
current
in
dispute
of
subject
a
thus remains
In 1968, Iran signed the NPT. Its facilities were subjected to
safeguards in 1974. During the 1970s, Iran also began construction
on a nuclear power plant at Bushehr under contract with a subsidiary
of Siemens, 159 which was temporarily abandoned after the 1979
Islamic Revolution. In 1975, Iran also commenced plans for extensive
nuclear research facilities at Esfahan Nuclear Technology Center
(ENTC) under contract with a French company. 160 This project was
completed in 1994 with the assistance of the Chinese. 161 The ENTC is

Agreement for Cooperation Between the Government of the United States
153.
and the Government of Iran Concerning the Civil Uses of Atomic Energy, U.S.-Iran,
Mar. 5, 1957, 10 U.S.T. 733. This five-year agreement was renewed multiple times
until it expired without renewal in April 1979. See Agreement Amending the
Agreement of March 5, 1957, U.S.-Iran, Mar. 18, 1969, 18 U.S.T. 205.
Agreement for Cooperation Between the Government of the United States
154.
and the Government of Iran Concerning the Civil Uses of Atomic Energy, supra note
153.

Research Reactor Details-Iran, IAEA (Oct. 1, 1998), http://www155.
naweb.iaea.org/napc/physics/research reactors/database/rr%20data%20base/datasets/r
eport/Iran,%20slamic%2Republic%20of%200%2Research%2OReactor%2ODetails%20%20TRR.htm.
IAEA, The Texts of the Instruments Connected with the Agency's Assistance
156.
to Iran in Establishing a Research Reactor Project, at 2-6, IAEA Doc. INFCIRC/97
(Aug. 31, 1967).
157.
Ivan Oelrich & Ivanka Barzashka, Deconstructing the Meaning of Iran's 20
Percent Uranium Enrichment, BULL. ATOMIC SCIENTISTS (May 19, 2010),
http://thebulletin.org/print/web-edition/features/deconstructing-themeaning-of-irans20-percent-uranium-enrichment.
158.
Id.
Iran Nuclear Facilities, NUCLEAR THREAT INITIATIVE, http://www.nti.org/
159.
eresearch/profiles/IranlNuclear/facilities.html (last visited Apr. 1, 2012).
Cable 1437 from U.S. Embassy Tehran to U.S. Dep't of State, GOI/AEOI
160.
Plans for Isfhahan Nuclear Technology Center, ENTEC (Feb. 14, 1977), available at
http://www.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb268/doc25b.pdf.
161.
Research Reactor Details ENTC MNSR, IAEA (Sept. 18, 2002),
,
http://www-naweb.iaea.org/napc/physics/researchreactors/database/rr%/20data%20
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currently the site of three research reactors (one of which has been
decommissioned), a uranium conversion facility, and related
162
laboratories and facilities.
Heightened concerns of nuclear weapons proliferation resulting
from India's 1974 test of a nuclear weapon triggered increased
scrutiny over nuclear cooperation arrangements in the following
years, affecting the United States' support of Iran's program. 163
Because India's acquisition of a nuclear weapon was achieved with
plutonium acquired through reprocessing capabilities provided by the
United States and Canada, the key concern in negotiating for
continuing assistance to Iran's already ambitious nuclear energy
plans in the 1970s was to limited reprocessing capabilities. 1 64 The
United States thus pressed for the establishment of a multinational
reprocessing center to meet Iran's reprocessing needs. 165 In part
responding to information about India's manipulation of the fuel cycle
to acquire the bomb, 166 the United States passed the Nonproliferation
Act of 1978, which required that transfers of nuclear material and
equipment involve strict adherence to IAEA safeguards and that
exports involving HEU receive heightened scrutiny. 167 Due to
increased political sensitivities, in 1977 the United States began to
delay export license requests for HEU pending the ongoing
negotiations for a new cooperation agreement. 168 Any exports from
the United States were effectively foreclosed after the Islamic
Revolution in 1979.169

base/datasets/report/Iran,%20Islamic%20Republic%20ofo 2 O0%2OResearch%20Reactor
%20Details%20-%20ENTC%20MNSR.htm.
162.
See IAEA, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic
Republic of Iran, Annex 1, IAEA Doc. GOV/2004/83 (Nov. 15, 2004).
163.
Paul Leventhal, Nuclear Deal with India: Sacrificing the NPT on an Altar
of Expediency, NUCLEAR CONTROL INST. (Dec. 8, 2006), http://www.nci.org/06nci12/nucindia-deal.htm.
164.
William Burr, A Brief History of U.S.-Iranian Nuclear Negotiations, 65
BULL. ATOMIC SCIENTISTS 21, 24 (2009).

165.
Id.
166.
See, e.g., Leventhal, supra note 163 (discussing the threat to negotiations
posed by India's use of "peaceful use only" contracts to produce plutonium for weapons).
167.
Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-242, §§ 201, 402, 92
Stat. 120, (codified as amended in various sections of 22 and 42 U.S.C. (2006)).
168.
Cable 115011 from U.S. Dep't of State to Embassy Tehran, HEU Exports to
Iran (May 19, 1977), available at http://www.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb268/
doc29a.pdf.
169.
See, e.g., Iran v. United States, Partial Award No. 529.A15-FT, 28 Iran-U.S.
CI. Trib. Rep. 112,
60 (May 6, 1992) (discussing the impact of the Algiers
Declarations, signed by the United States and the Islamic Republic of Iran, on the
application of United States export control laws, including the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Act of 1978).
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After the Islamic Revolution, the status of Iran's contracts for
nuclear development was cast into doubt. 170 The new Iranian
government, the Islamic Republic of Iran, continued to seek fuel for
the operation of the TRR. 171 In 1987, it arranged a contract with
Argentina for the reconfiguration of its reactor core to run on 20
percent HEU and for the supply of the uranium. 172 Iran also sought
to resume work on its declared facilities at Bushehr and Esfahan. In
1992, Iran concluded a contract with Russia to complete work on its
nuclear power plant at Bushehr. 173 In the early 1990s, China assisted
174
Iran in establishing new reactor facilities at the ENTC in Esfahan.
According to representations made by Iran to the IAEA, a
decision was made in 1985 to expand Iran's nuclear capabilities,
including planning facilities for enrichment. 175 Iran claimed that it
made this decision in order to meet its growing energy needs and to
build on investments already made in the nuclear industry. 176 Iran
maintains that its inability to obtain nuclear fuel cycle facilities or
technology from abroad led to its decision to seek supplies for those
products on the black market. 177 According to the IAEA, Iran sought
and obtained these materials through the 1990s from a "clandestine
supply network" 178 (widely understood to be the proliferation

170.
According to Iran, contracts amounting to approximately $10 billion with
France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States went unfulfilled in the
post-Revolution period. IAEA Doc. GOV/2007/58, supra note 152,
4. For a publicly
available accounting of some of the resulting disputes, see Nuclear Chronology: Iran,
INITIATIVE
(Mar.
2012),
1957-1985,
NUCLEAR
THREAT
http://www.nti.org/e-research/profiles/Iran/1825.html (detailing disputes over Iran's
uranium enrichment program).
171.
See Iran v. United States, 8 Iran-U.S.Cl. Trib. Rep. 63 (1985) (rejecting
Iran's request for interim measures to halt the sale of nuclear fuel by General Atomic
Company in the United States).
172.
IAEA, Additional Supply Agreement of 9 December 1988 Between the
InternationalAtomic Energy Agency and the Governments of the Islamic Republic of
Iran and of Argentina for the Transfer of Enriched Uranium for a Research Reactor in
Iran, IAEA Doc. INFCIRC/97/Add.2 (Jan. 1990); CHRISTINA WALROND, INST. FOR SCI. &
INT'L SEC., TIMELINE, 1967-1993: ARGENTINE LoW-ENRICHED URANIUM AT TEHRAN
RESEARCH REACTOR (Oct. 7, 2009), http://www.isisnucleariran.org/assets/pdf/
Tehran reactor timeline.pdf.
173.
World News Briefs; Russia Spells out Pact with Iran for A-Plant, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 21, 1985, at A9.
174.
Research Reactor Details-ENTC MNSR, supranote 161.
175.
IAEA Doc. GOV/2007/58, supra note 152, 4.
176.
Id.
177.
Id. 5.
178.
Iran and Pakistan allegedly concluded a nuclear cooperation agreement in
1986, although this has not been publicly verified. See, e.g., Farzad Bazoft, Iran Signs
Secret Atom Deal, LONDON OBSERVER, June 12, 1988, at 1; Jack Boureston & Charles
D. Ferguson, Schooling Iran's Atom Squad, BULL. ATOMIC SCIENTISTS, May-June
2004, at 31, 32, (discussing a 1987 deal that allegedly called for at least six Iranians to
be trained in Pakistan). The IAEA confirmed that Iran and Pakistan conducted secret
negotiations and equipment supply arrangements during the time period 1987-1996 in
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179
masterminded by A.Q. Khan, the "father of Pakistan's bomb").
Although Iran assured the IAEA that no military institutions were
involved in the decision making or implementation of the centrifuge
enrichment program, 180 most of the workshops involved in the
domestic production of Iran's centrifuge components were owned by

8
military industrial organizations.'1
Iran's centrifuge enrichment program proceeded without the
knowledge of the IAEA from 1985 until late 2002, when an Iranian
dissident group revealed the existence of undeclared enrichment
facilities at Kalaye Electric Company in Tehran and in Natanz, as
well as a heavy water construction plant in Arak. l8 2 Responding to
this information, the IAEA made numerous requests, leading to
disclosures in 2003 of undeclared nuclear facilities, including
radiological laboratories and waste handling facilities at the TNRC, a
centrifuge enrichment research and development center at the stateowned Kalaye Electric Company in Tehran, enrichment facilities at
Natanz, a dismantled pilot uranium laser enrichment plant at
Lashkar Ab'ad, plans for new reactor facilities and a heavy water
plant at Arak, and additional waste disposal sites. 18 3 On September
21, 2009, Iran declared it was building another centrifuge enrichment
facility on a military base in Qom, known as the Fordow facility.1 8 4 In
November 2009, Iran publicly announced that it intended to build ten
new enrichment facilities and had identified five potential
locations.18 5 In response to an IAEA query on the accuracy of those
reports, Iran stated that it would "provide the Agency with the
18 6
required information if necessary."'

November 2007. IAEA Doc. GOV/2007/58, supra note 152,
25. See generally
ELBARADEI, supra note 151 (providing an overview of A.Q. Khan's "nuclear bazaar").
179.
See, e.g., James Astill, Nuclear Inquiry Targets Fatherof Pakistani Bomb,
GUARDIAN (London), Jan. 27, 2004, at 15 (describing Khan as a "prime suspect"
involved in alleged sales of nuclear technology to Iran).
180.
See IAEA Doc. GOV/2007/58, supra note 152,
10 ("In response to the
Agency's enquiry as to whether there was any military involvement in the programme,
Iran has stated that no institution other than the AEOI was involved in the decisionmaking process or the implementation of the centrifuge enrichment programme.").
181.
Id.
18 (citing IAEA, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in
the Islamic Republic of Iran, 37, IAEA Doc. GOV/2004/11, (Feb. 24, 2004)).
182.
IAEA, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and Relevant
Provisions of Security Council Resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) and
1835 (2008) in the Islamic Republic of Iran: Rep. by the Director General, 7, IAEA
Doc. GOV/2009/74 (Nov. 16, 2009).
183.
Id.
184.
Id.; David E. Sanger & William J. Broad, U.S. and Allies Warn over Iran
NuclearDeception, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 2009, at Al.
185. . David E. Sanger & William J. Broad, A Defiant Iran Vows to Build Nuclear
Plants,N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 2009, at Al.
186.
IAEA, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and Relevant
Provisions of Security Council Resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) and
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In February 2010, Iran reported to the IAEA that it would begin
enriching uranium to 20 percent at Natanz.18 7 The IAEA indicated in
response that Iran had given insufficient notice under its safeguards
agreement for the Agency to adequately adjust its safeguards and
understand the original purpose of the facility.18 8 As of October 28,
2011, the Natanz facility was estimated to have enriched a total of
approximately 79.7 kilograms of uranium at 20 percent. 189 Iran
announced in June 2011 that it planned to triple its production of
uranium-235 enriched up to 20 percent. 190 Iran justifies its
production as necessary to provide fuel for the TRR. 19 1 Although it
does not currently have the technology to manufacture fuel from this
enriched uranium, Iran is in the process of creating such a capability
in its fuel manufacturing plant at Esfahan. 192 The expansion of Iran's
enrichment at 20 percent raises concerns relating to its ability to
produce enough HEU for a nuclear weapon. 193 The capacity to enrich
to 20 percent would also allow Iran to swiftly enrich to 90 percent,
facilitating a plausible breakout scenario to acquire nuclear
weapons. 194 As of November 1, 2011, the IAEA reported that Iran had
produced at total of 4922 kilograms of LEU, from which Iran could
produce roughly four bombs at a slower pace. 195 The International
Institute for Strategic Studies has estimated that with approximately
172 kilograms of uranium enriched at 20 percent, Iran could produce
in three-week period the necessary 25 kilograms of 93 percent
weapons-grade uranium-235 to manufacture a nuclear explosive
device. 196

1835 (2008) in the Islamic Republic of Iran, 1 33, IAEA Doc. GOV2010/10 (Feb. 18,
2010).
187.
Id. 8.
188.

Id. 11 34, 48.

189.
IAEA Doc. GOV/2011/65, supra note 68, Annex, 15.
190.
IAEA Worried over Iran Plans to Triple Uranium Production, JERUSALEM
POST (July 7, 2011), http://www.jpost.com/IranianThreat/News/Article.aspx?id=228260.
191.
See IAEA, Communication Dated 1 March 2010 Received from the Resident
Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the Agency RegardingAssurances of
Nuclear Fuel Supply, at 1-2, IAEA Doc. INFCIRC/785 (Mar. 2, 2010) (discussing
Iranian historical difficulties in obtaining fuel supply for its research reactor).
192.
See IAEA Doc. GOV/2011/65, supra note 68,
32, 36-37 (noting the
existence of a fuel manufacturing plant at Esfahan and the start of nondestructive
testing). Fitzpatrick notes that Iran's plans to fabricate fuel for the TRR will require
prolonged testing, may be unsafe, and in any event the TRR may no longer have
sufficient power for this testing by the time the fuel is ready for testing. See THE INT'L
INST.

FOR

STRATEGIC

STUDIES,

IRAN'S

NUCLEAR,

CHEMICAL

AND

BIOLOGICAL

CAPABILITIES: A NET ASSESSMENT 121 (Mark Fitzpatrick ed., 2011).
193.
Id. at 72-73.
194.
Id. In addition, Iran produced 6 kilograms of 20 percent enriched uranium
in a six-week period at Natanz. IAEA Doc. GOV/2011/65, supra note 68, 15.
195.

THE INT'L INST. FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES, supra note 192, at 74.

196.

Id.
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In November 2011, the IAEA released a report providing
extensive detail relating to possible military dimensions of Iran's
nuclear energy program. The report largely reiterated concerns
previously expressed regarding possible military dimensions of Iran's
nuclear energy program. 197 These concerns include outstanding
questions relating to possession of a document from Pakistan
providing instructions on the conversion of weapons-grade uranium
into a hemispheric metal device suitable for use as a weapon, known
as the "Project Green Salt";198 evidence relating to "work alleged to
have been performed to redesign the inner cone of the Shahab-3
missile reentry vehicle to accommodate a nuclear warhead"; 199
alleged administrative interconnections between the "Green Salt"
project and the "project to modify the Shahab-3 missile to carry a
nuclear warhead"; 200 a letter published by the Chairman of Iran's
Expediency Council in September 2006 that references possible
acquisition of nuclear weapons; 20 1 additional information relating to
the history of Iran's nuclear program, including the extent of contacts
with the Khan network and the origination of those efforts at a highlevel meeting in 1984 on reviving Iran's prerevolution nuclear
program; 20 2 and evidence that Iran conducted experiments involving
the explosive compression of uranium deuteride, another component
process of weaponization. 20 3 The Agency has also indicated that it
was in possession of evidence that "some activities relevant to the
development of a nuclear explosive device continued after 2003, and
'20 4
that some may still be ongoing.
Efforts to resolve doubts about Iran's nuclear program have
involved multiparty negotiations, three IAEA referrals to the Security
Council, 20 5 seven Security Council Resolutions, and state-authorized
economic sanctions programs. 20 6 The existence of a covert program

197.
IAEA Doc. GOV/2011/65, supra note 68, Annex.
198.
IAEA Doc. GOV/2008/15, supra note 152,
14, 24.
199.
Id. 17.
200.
Id. 21.
201.
Id. Annex B.2.
202.
Id.
203.
IAEA, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and Relevant
Provisions of Security Council Resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran, 35, IAEA
Doc. GOV/2011/29 (May 24, 2011).
204.
IAEA Doc. GOV/2011/65, supranote 68, 45.
205.
See IAEA, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and Relevant
Provisions of Security Council Resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) and
1835 (2008) in the Islamic Republic of Iran, IAEA Doc. GOV/2009/82 (Nov. 27, 2009);
IAEA, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of
Iran, IAEA Doc. GOV/2006/15 (Feb. 27, 2006); IAEA, Implementation of the NPT
Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran, IAEA Doc. GOV/2005/77 (Sept.
24, 2005).
206,
See IAEA Doc. GOV/2010/10, supra note 186; IAEA Doc. GOV/2009/82,
supra note 204; IAEA Doc. GOV/2006/15, supra note 205; IAEA Doc. GOV/2005/77,
supra note 205.
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may also be presumed, considering the reports of computer malware
targeting Iran's centrifuge program, 20 7 industrial sabotage, 20 8 and
209
targeted killings of Iranian scientists.
On the negotiation side, talks with the "EU-3" (France,
Germany, and the United Kingdom) initially produced an agreement
for Iran to suspend its uranium enrichment. However, the talks broke
down when it was revealed that Iran was continuing its
preenrichment conversion of uranium. 210 In 2004, Iran agreed to a
more stringent suspension of its enrichment-related activities, and
several proposals were exchanged in the 2004-2005 period on issues
relating to Iran's nuclear program, regional security cooperation, and
export issues. 211 Iran expressed dissatisfaction with the talks in
August 2005, however, and exercised its purported "inalienable right
'212
to resume its legal enrichment activities.
In June 2006, China, Russia, and the United States joined the
negotiations, which became known as the "P5+1" group. 213 The group
offered Iran the prospect of two light water reactors, fuel guarantees,
and technical and agricultural cooperation, yet the talks remain
stalled as Iran continued to refuse to suspend its enrichment. 214 In
May 2008, as the P5+1 was revising its proposal for continuing
negotiations, Iran outlined multiple steps, or "modalities" leading to
full negotiations, although that proposal did not specifically address
the outstanding concerns relating to Iran's nuclear program. 215 In
June 2008, the P5+1 presented its revised proposal, offering the
prospect of a normalization of trade relations, support for Iran to join
the World Trade Organization (WTO), cooperation on Afghanistan

207.
John Markoff, Malware Aimed at Iran Hit Five Sites, Report Says, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 13, 2011, at A15; Shane, supra note 4, at Al.
Scott Shane & Artin Afkhami, Allegations of Iranian and U.S. Plots Are
208.
Added to a History of Hostility, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 2011, atA6.
209.
Rick Gladstone, Iran Tightens Its Security for Scientists After Killing, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 18, 2012, at A6.
See Peter Crail, History of Official Proposals on the IranianNuclear Issue,
210.
ARMS CONTROL ASS'N, http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/IranNuclearProposals

(last visited Apr. 1, 2012).
211.
Id.
212.
Communication Dated 1 August 2005 Received from the Permanent Mission
of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the Agency, at 2-3, IAEA Doc. No. INFCIRC/648 (Aug.
1, 2005).
See Helene Cooper, U.S. Is Offering Deals on Trade to Entice Iran, N.Y.
213.
TIMES, June 6, 2006, at Al (discussing the collaboration of Britain, China, France,
Russia, United States and Germany in resolving the nuclear crisis with Iran).
See Permanent Representative of France to the U.N., Letter dated 13 July
214.
2006 from the Permanent Representative of France to the United Nations addressed to
the President of the Security Council, Annex, U.N. Doc. S/2006/521 (July 13, 2006).
215.
Letter from Manuchehr Mottaki, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Islamic
Republic of Iran, to Ban Ki-moon, U.N. Secretary Gen. (May 13, 2008) (unofficial
translation), available at http://www.armscontrol.org/system/files/IranProposal2OMay
2008.pdf.
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and the drug trade at the borders, and assurances regarding the
2 16
nonuse of force.
In 2009, the P5+1 and Iran agreed to a "fuel swap" as a
confidence building measure, in which Iran's representatives in
Vienna agreed that Iran would send 1,200 kilograms of its
domestically produced LEU-which at the time represented most of
its supply-to be enriched to 20 percent in Russia and converted to
fuel in France. 217 Iranian officials sought to modify that fuel swap
arrangement, leading to its effective rejection. 218 Turkey and Brazil
later tried to revive the fuel swap deal, but that effort faltered in May
2010.219 The proposal ultimately went nowhere, in part because Iran
had at that point doubled its stockpile of LEU. 220 The P5+1 held
additional negotiations in late 2010 and early 2011, which were
ultimately unproductive. 221 Negotiations between Iran and the P5+1
resumed in April 2012.222
The Security Council addressed the Iranian nuclear situation in
one presidential statement (March 2003) and six subsequent Security
Council resolutions. 223 In addition to endorsing and reinforcing the
negotiation framework of the EU-3 and P5+1, the resolutions
authorize a wide range of measures affecting Iran's economic
224
interests under Article 41 if the UN Charter.

216.
Communication Dated 25 June 2008 Received from the Resident
Representative of the United Kingdom to the Agency Concerninga Letter and Offer of 12
June 2008 Delivered to the Islamic Republic of Iran, IAEA Doc. INFCIRC/730 (July 1,
2008).
217.
Steven Erlanger and Mark Landler, IranAgrees to Send Enriched Uranium
to Russia, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 2009, at Al.
218.
See Interview with Ali Bagheri, Deputy Secretary, Iran's Supreme Nat. Sec.
Council
(Apr.
18,
2010),
available
at
http://www.tehrantimes.com/
indexView.asp?code=218880.
219.
David E. Sanger & Michael Slackman, U.S. Is Skeptical on IranianDeal for
Nuclear Fuel, N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 2010, at Al. The IAEA at that time estimated that
Iran had produced 2427 kilograms of LEU since February 2007. IAEA Doc.
GOV/2010/28, supranote 89, 5.
220.
See IAEA Doc. GOV/2010/28, supranote 89,
6-13.
221.
Joby Warrick, Nuclear Talks with Iran Edge Toward Collapse, WASH. POST,
Jan. 21, 2011.
222.
Steven Erlanger, At Nuclear Talks in Turkey, Iran and Six Nations Agree to
Meet Again in Iraq, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15, 2012, at A13.
223.
U.N. President of the S.C., Statement, U.N. Doc. S/PRST/2006/15 (Mar. 29,
2006); S.C. Res. 1929, supra note 83; S.C. Res. 1835, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1835 (Sept. 27,
2008); S.C. Res. 1747, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1747 (Mar. 24, 2007); S.C. Res. 1803, supra
note 90; S.C. Res. 1737, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1737 (Dec. 27, 2006); S.C. Res. 1696, U.N.
Doc. S/RES/1696 (July 31, 2006).
224.
Article 41 states:
The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed
force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the
Members of the United Nations to apply such measures. These may include
complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air,
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The most stringent measures to date are contained in Security
Council Resolution 1929, which included or authorized the seizure of
items relating to sanctioned activities; 225 targeted financial measures
against Iranian shipping lines; 226 extended sanctions against Iran's
Revolutionary Guards; 227 and a halt to the provision of financial
services, including insurance and reinsurance, related to any
activities that could be proliferation sensitive. 228 While earlier
resolutions relating to the sale, supply, or transfer contained
language restricting these measures to the territorial jurisdiction of
the enforcing state, Resolution 1929 appears to lift this territorial
restriction in the context of Iran's ballistic missile program.
Specifically, the Council authorized member states to take "all
necessary measures to prevent the transfer of technology or technical
assistance to Iran related to [activities concerning ballistic missiles
capable of delivering weapons]. ''229 Such necessary measures cannot
be considered to include force, however, as all authorized action was
2 30
taken under the express authority of Article 41 of the UN Charter.
The apparent lack of a territorial restriction regarding measures
addressed to Iran's ballistic missiles program appears to permit
extraterritorial actions (not amounting to a use of force) to interfere
with Iran's receipt of such items. The seizure provisions of the
Resolution 1929 are also wide-ranging, extending to items related to
enrichment activities, reprocessing, heavy water production facilities,
armaments, certain dual-use technology, combat equipment, and
ballistic missile technology. 231 Seizures under the resolution must be

postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means
severance of diplomatic relations.

of communication, and

the

U.N. Charter art. 41.
225.
S.C. Res. 1929, supra note 83, 16.
Id. 19.
226.
Id. app. II.
227.
228.
Id. 21.
229.
Id. 9.
Id. pmbl.
230.
231.
The seizure provisions cross-reference previous resolutions calling upon
members to prevent the supply, sale or transfer "directly or indirectly from their
territories or by their nationals or using their flag vessels or aircraft." The relevant
provision reads as follows:
[The Security Council] [d]ecides to authorize all States to, and that all States
shall, seize and dispose of (such as through destruction, rendering inoperable,
storage or transferring to a State other than the originating or destination
States for disposal) items the supply, sale, transfer, or export of which is
prohibited by paragraphs 3, 4 or 7 of resolution 1737 (2006), paragraph 5 of
resolution 1747 (2007), paragraph 8 of resolution 1803 (2008) or paragraphs 8
or 9 of this resolution that are identified in inspections pursuant to paragraphs
14 or 15 of this resolution, in a manner that is not inconsistent with their
obligations under applicable Security Council resolutions, including resolution
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made in a manner consistent with Security Council Resolution 1540,
which encourages the application of domestic controls to prevent
232
proliferation.
Although Iran continues to deny an intention to build a nuclear
weapon, it is fast-approaching threshold capability and has effectively
asserted a right for itself to develop that capability. Iran's President
recently reiterated Iran's ambiguous position that it did not intend to
build a nuclear weapon, but that "[i]f we want to make a bomb, we
are not afraid of anybody. 2 33
Addressing concerns relating to the supply of fuel for Iran's
nuclear reactors will no doubt comprise a key ingredient in resolving
the current stalemate over Iran's nuclear program. One possible
means of addressing issues relating to past and potential fuel supply
agreements could involve the negotiation of a fuel guarantee for those
reactors in exchange for Iran's agreement to scale back its
enrichment program. Under such a scenario, the Iran-United States
Claims Tribunal in The Hague could serve as a venue for the
expedited arbitration of any disputes over new fuel supply or nuclear
cooperation agreements. The existence of a mechanism for expedited
arbitration of any new agreements may provide additional security
that those agreements will be enforceable. Incorporating the Tribunal
into such a fuel guarantee arrangement would provide an opportunity
for the parties to address differences relating to prior contracts and
perhaps broader issues, while restructuring that Tribunal in order to
streamline its work.
The successful resolution of outstanding issues related to Iran's
nuclear program will require persistent efforts at both the diplomatic
level and within the IAEA safeguards system.

C. Reconciling Treatment of Non-NPT States
with a Prevention Regime
The existence of nuclear-weapons states outside of the NPT
on the already unequal system
framework puts strains
institutionalized in the NPT, complicating the business of developing
consistent legal standards for preventing the spread of nuclear
weapons development. There are two categories of outlier states in
this regard. The first category was addressed above, and includes

1540 (2004), as well as any obligations of parties to the NPT, and decides
further that all States shall cooperate in such efforts.

Id. 16.
Id.; see infra Part V.A.
232.
233. Ahmadinejad: Iran 'Not Afraid' to Produce Nuclear Weapon, but Doesn't
23,
2011),
(June
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http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/06/23/ahmadinejad-iran-not-afraid-nuclearweapon-_n_882797.html.
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states who ratify the NPT and either do not comply or seek to
withdraw in order to cross the nuclear threshold. The second category
comprises those states that have not signed the NPT but emerged as
nuclear weapons powers at a later time. The principal actors in the
latter group are India, Pakistan, and Israel, none of whom ever
signed the NPT (although each joined the IAEA in 1957). States that
have already been integrated into the global nonproliferation regime
based on their consent to the NPT cannot so easily reverse the clock
to qualify as non-NPT states. When states seek to withdraw from the
NPT, a host of legal and political issues will complicate their efforts to
do so. Non-NPT party states occupy a distinct legal status, which is in
many ways a throwback to the world that existed before the NPT,
where ad hoc alliances and power relationships took precedence.
The NPT outliers are not bound by the specific provisions of the
NPT, but are bound by customary nonproliferation legal norms. It can
be argued that the non-NPT states that chose not to join the regime
were legally entitled to develop nuclear weapons, so long as they did
not benefit from technology shared in violation of treaties and state
practices that restrict the trade in proliferation-sensitive items.
Attempts to apply nonproliferation norms to non-NPT states are
complicated by the inherently unequal nature of the nonproliferation
regime, which contemplates differential treatment of states that are
permitted to have nuclear weapons and those that are not. The
inequalities institutionalized in the NPT 234 are, however, premised on
a system that provisionally prioritizes the security of a world in
which nuclear weapons do not proliferate, 235 free trade in nuclear
technology so long as it is used for peaceful purposes, and a long-term
nuclear disarmament framework.
To the extent that nonproliferation law has developed based on a
norm of security among nations and centered on the long-term goal of
disarmament, then disarmament would be the logical soft law norm
to apply in guiding policy decisions on the outlier states. 236
International treaties, state practice, and Security Council
pronouncements more specifically prohibit the non-NPT states from
engaging in proliferation of nuclear weapons technology. Even if the

234.
See, e.g., NPT, supra note 3, art. 1.
235.
See generally Joseph Nye, The Logic of Inequality, 59 FOREIGN POL'Y 123,
125-26 (1985) ("Even though superpower compliance with Article VI of the NPT has
been inadequate, many states will continue to adhere because they believe their
security will be diminished if more states-particularly their regional rivals--obtain
nuclear weapons.").
For a discussion of the characteristics of "soft law," see ALAN BOYLE &
236.
CHRISTINE CHINKIN, THE MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 163-64 (2007) and also

Gregory C. Shaffer & Mark A. Pollack, Hard Versus Soft Law in InternationalSecurity,
52 B.C. L. REV. 1147, 1158 (2011) ("Soft law, in this sense, represents a modern variant
of the 'law to be made,' lex ferenda, which reflects the aspiration of law's progressive
development.").
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non-NPT states can be said to legally possess nuclear weapons, this
does not entitle those states to distribute proliferation-sensitive items
and knowledge to states that are fully integrated into the global
nonproliferation regime.
The global nonproliferation regime cannot be said to be a
universally applicable legal system so long as outlier states choose
not to participate in that regime. The outlier states nonetheless
operate in a world in which that regime dominates the international
legal landscape, affecting their ability to trade in nuclear technology.
Applying nonproliferation norms to outlier states without the benefit
of a clearly defined legal regime may involve fact-based assessments
designed to address concerns that the outlier states will serve as
resources for proliferation to states that do participate in the
nonproliferation legal system. Indicators that may present high levels
of proliferation risk in this context could include, for example,
political instability, evidence of clandestine proliferation networks,
and connections to groups that may have an interest in proliferating
military technologies for military purposes. Such analysis is relevant
to maintenance of an effective verification system for the NPT states
while further integration of the outliers into the global
nonproliferation regime is pending.

V. ECONOMIC COUNTERPROLIFERATION MEASURES

The Security Council and states may institute a variety of
measures to address perceived threats to international peace and
security. Peace and security measures designed to affect the behavior
of states may fall into one of three principal legal categories. The first
category involves actions that may be taken as a function of the
exercise of sovereign rights that do not violate general principles of
international law (i.e., retorsion). The second category involves
measures that may otherwise violate international law that could
possibly be justified as countermeasures, but do not involve the use of
force. The third category involves the use of force. Unilateral
economic measures generally fall into the first of these categories,
posing legal limitations in the area of extraterritorial effect.
Even where unilateral sanctions may apply extraterritorially,
gaps in trade can be easily filled by nonparticipating entities. More
effective sanctioning tools include the use of multilateral regimes or
Security Council action under Article 41 of the UN Charter, which
allows for the fullest legal expression of internationally coordinated
economic action. 237 The effect of those sanctions will also be
determined by their scope, which may extend to the entirety of a

237.

U.N. Charter art. 41.
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state's economic activity. Current international sanctions addressing
proliferation activities have targeted only selected activities and
industries, far from the full scope possible under Article 41.
The term "sanction" carries a broad connotation, 238 but is most
often used in the context of restrictions on trade and commerce.
Economic sanctions are a subset of trade controls targeted to
influence the behavior of a state, and in the context of international
law, to ensure compliance with international rights and obligations.
They may also be considered as countermeasures under the regime of
state responsibility if they qualify as a response to specific wrongful
behavior. 239 Legal restrictions in the context of the law of state
responsibility would include a requirement of proportionality, taking
into account the gravity of the targeted wrongful act.240 Even under
economic
however,
state
responsibility,
the
regime
of
countermeasures may cause a disproportionate economic impact
24 1
when they are gauged to enforce an important legal principle.
Humanitarian law, human rights concerns, and due process concerns
may also affect the legality of sanctions under certain
circumstances 242
A. Extraterritoriality:JurisdictionalImpediments
to Effective Prevention
Unilateral economic sanctions fall within the purview of
sovereign authority and thus do not generally require specific
justification under international law. The authority to regulate
economic conduct within a state's jurisdiction is incident to its

238.
See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1459 (9th ed. 2009) (defining sanction under
international law as "[aln economic or military coercive measure taken by one or more
countries toward another to force it to comply with international law"); Georges AbiSaab, The Concept of Sanction in International Law, in UNITED NATIONS SANCTIONS
AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 38, at 29, 32 (defining sanctions in the generic
sense as "coercive measures taken in execution of a decision of a competent social
organ, i.e., an organ legally empowered to act in the name of the society or community
or community that is governed by the legal system").
239.
See generally Calamita, supra note 40 (arguing that states retain the right
"to take unilateral countermeasures in response to wrongful acts").
240.
Rep. of the Int'l Law Comm'n, 56th Sess., Apr 23-June 1, July 2-Aug. 10,
2001, U.N. Doc. A/56/10; GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10 (2001) [hereinafter Draft
Articles on State Responsibility]
Air Services Agreement of 27 March 1946 (U.S. v. Fr.), 18 R.I.A.A. 417
241.
(Perm.'Ct. Arb. 1978) (holding that suspension of all Air France flights from Los
Aigeles and Paris was proportional to allow an American carrier on the same route to
route through London due to the importance of the issue "in the general framework
of. . . air transport policy."). See generally Lori Fisler Damrosch, Retaliation or
Arbitration-orBoth? The 1978 United States-FranceAviation Dispute, 74 AM. J. INT'L
L. 785, 791 (1980) ("[I]n France's view the economic consequences of the Pan Am
service and the Air France service were grossly disproportionate.").
242.
See discussion infra Part V.B.
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sovereign powers 243 and is not subject to review under international
law.244 The International Court of Justice (ICJ) confirmed in the
Nicaragua cases that economic measures directed at other states do
not violate the customary international principle of nonintervention
in the internal or external affairs of a state. 245 Economic measures
are not within the ambit of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter prohibiting
the use of force. 246 In some cases, unilateral sanctions may violate
trade agreements, 24 7 but most such agreements permit exceptions for
national security matters. 248 The principal legal questions relating to
unilateral economic sanctions relate to their extraterritorial effect,
underscoring jurisdictional impediments to the effectiveness of
unilateral sanctions. Recent European case law also illustrates that
courts may accord due process rights to sanctioned individuals when
targeted sanctions are unsubstantiated and impinge on fundamental
rights, such as the right to be heard, the right to property, and the
249
right to an effective legal remedy.

243.

U.S. export control is based on the premise that there are no rights to

export, only privileges. See ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD, TRADE CONTROLS FOR POLITICAL
ENDS 35 (2d ed. 1983); see also JAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL

LAW 509 (6th ed. 2003) ("State measures, prima facie a lawful exercise of powers by
government, may affect foreign interests considerably .... Thus foreign assets and
their use may be subject to taxation, trade restrictions involving licenses and quotas, or
measures of devaluation.").
244.
See Iran v. United States, 38 Iran.U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 197, 262-64 (2009)
(holding that the United States' exercise of the sovereign right to deny export of
defense articles own by Iran did not constitute interference with Iran's ownership or
property rights); Iran v. United States, 19 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 273, 292 (1988)
("[Tihe President's exercise of the discretion conferred upon him by... the [Arms
Export Control] Act ... is the exercise of a sovereign right which is not subject to
review by an international tribunal.").
245.
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v.
U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 126 (June 27) ("[T]he Court has merely to say that it is unable to
regard such action on the economic plane as is here complained of as a breach of the
customary-law principle of non-intervention."); IAN BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW
AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 362 (1963) ("[W]hilst it is correct to assume that
paragraph 4 applies to force other than armed force, it is very doubtful if it applies to
economic measures of a coercive nature." (footnotes omitted)).
246.
See Abram Chayes, Nicaragua, the United States, and the World Court, 85
COLUM. L. REV. 1445, 1463 n.89 (1985) ("The record of the San Francisco Conference is
quite clear that article 2(4) was intended to refer to military rather than political or
economic force."); see also United Nations Conference on Int'l Org., Doc. 784, I/1/27, 6
U.N.C.I.O. Docs. 331, 334 (Apr. 25, 1945); United Nations Conference on Int'l Org.,
Doc. 215, 1/1/10, 6 U.N.C.I.O. Docs. 559 (Apr. 25, 1945) (rejecting Brazilian amendment
to include "the threat or use of economic measures" within the ambit of Article 2(4)).
247.
See LOWENFELD, supra note 243, at 446 (noting that products would not be
entitled to most favored nation treatment in the context of mandatory UN sanctions).
248.
See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. XXI, Oct. 30, 1947, 61
Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 (creating security exception to trade agreements). See
generally, JOYNER, supra note 41, at 126-30.
249.
See Joined Cases C-402 & 415/05P, Kadi v. Council, 2008 E.C.R 1-6351,
para. 334; Case T-85/09, Kadi v. Comm'n, 2010 E.C.R. 1-2729, para. 157. See generally
Griinne de Brca, The European Court of Justice and the InternationalLegal Order
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States issuing unilateral sanctions do not actually regulate the
conduct of the targeted state, but the conduct of those within the
sanctioning state's jurisdiction that are doing business with the
targeted state. International law distinguishes between primary and
secondary boycotts in this regard. Under primary boycotts, a state
250
regulates conduct in its own territory or over its own nationals.
Secondary boycotts are "extraterritorial" insofar as their effect is to
exercise jurisdiction over third-country foreign nationals for conduct
that takes place outside of the sanctioning state's territorial
jurisdiction. 251 Commonly accepted extraterritorial export controls
include restrictions on the reexport of sensitive goods and know-how
based on country of origin. Extraterritorial sanctions do not affect the
jurisdiction of the targeted state, and thus could violate no
jurisdictional obligations toward that state. Issues of legality are
therefore matters to be addressed between the sanctioned state and
affected third-party states.
A variety of principles have been used to justify departures from
the basic norm that jurisdiction applies only on the basis of
nationality or territorial control. 252 Scholars have disagreed as to
whether extraterritorial jurisdiction is in fact a violation of
international law. 253 While the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction
may or may not be considered legal, the third state whose sovereignty
is allegedly impinged need not recognize the validity of such
jurisdiction and may affirmatively exercise its sovereign rights to

After Kadi, 51 HARv. INT'L L.J. 1, 42 (2010) ("Arguments could have been advanced not
only about customary international law as a basis for due process protection, but also
about the references to protection of human rights in the U.N. Charter itself, as well as
in the general principles of international law and jus cogens principles which were
invoked by the CFI.").
250.
LOWENFELD, supra note 243, at 314.
251.
See generally Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Congress and Cuba: The Helms-Burton
Act, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 419, 429-30 (1996). Secondary boycotts are not new. Prominent
cases include sanctions against companies doing business with the Soviet Union during
the Cold War, the "Arab Boycott" against Israel, and sanctions against Iran in current
disputes with the United States. See id. at 429.
252.
These include (1) the protective principle to protect state security interests;
(2) the principle of universality applicable, for example, to crimes against humanity; (3)
the passive personality principle, which looks at the victim of a crime; (4) the effects
doctrine relating to the effects the targeted behavior is likely to have in the originating
state; and (5) the universality principle for crimes that are universally unlawful.
Harvard Research in Int'l Law, Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime, 29 AM. J. INT'L L.
439, 445 (1935).
253.
For contrasting views in the context of the Helms-Burton Act, see
Lowenfeld, supra note 251, at 413-33 ("It would be very sad indeed if conflicts over an
exorbitant and unreasonable piece of U.S. legislation were to divert attention from the
deplorable events occurring in Cuba, and were even to attract sympathy for the Castro
regime .... ); Brice M. Clagett, The Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity
(Libertad)Act, Continued:A Reply to Professor Lowenfeld, 90 AM. J. INT'L L 641, 61444 (1996); Brice M. Clagett, Title III of the Helms-Burton Act Is Consistent with
InternationalLaw, 90 AM. J. INT'L L 434 (1996).
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counteract extraterritorial actions. This was the case when the
United States enacted antiboycott legislation to penalize any
companies that complied with the Arab boycott of Israel. 25 4 It was
also the case in the French court decision in Fruehaufv. Massardy, in
which American sanctions interfered with the business operations of
a French company.
Fruehaufillustrates the challenges faced when interests conflict
among multiple jurisdictions. The case was triggered from U.S.
prohibitions on trade by U.S.-controlled foreign corporations with
China and North Korea during the Cold War (under the Trading with
the Enemy Act).255 In 1965, the U.S. Treasury Department ordered
Fruehauf Detroit, the parent company of S.A. Fruehauf-France, a
French company, to either cancel a contract it had executed to supply
a large order of semitrailers destined for the People's Republic of
China, or face criminal penalties. 256 Facing severe economic
consequences from the prospect of cancelling a major contract with a
client comprising 40 percent of the company's business, the French
directors of the corporation sought an order appointing a temporary
2 57
administrator to manage the company and carry out the contract.
The French court accepted the request and held that the management
of the company could carry out its order for the semitrailers,
2 58
safeguarding the interests of the corporation under French law.
When faced with the declaration of the French court, the United
States decided not to pursue the matter further. Respect for the
principle of comity among nations prevailed in this instance, possibly

254.
See LOWENFELD, supra note 243, at 322 ("Extraterritorial application of
[the U.S. antiboycott legislation] is a side effect-albeit an important one-designed for
the most part to prevent evasion of primary restraints on activity by Americans in the
United States; the Arab boycott, in contrast, is in very large measure extraterritorial,
in that it is designed in the first instance to affect activity carried on abroad by nonArab persons or firms.").
255.
Cour d'appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Paris, 14e ch., May 22, 1965,
Gaz. Pal. 1965, 2, 86 (Fr.), discussed in French Court Decision on Jurisdiction over
Subsidiaries of Foreign Corporations, 5 I.L.M. 476, 476 (1966). Corporate nationality
under international law tends to favor the nationality of the state of incorporation. See,
e.g., Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co. (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 3, 34 (Feb. 5)
("Municipal law determines the legal situation not only of such limited liability
companies but also of those persons who hold shares in them. Separated from the
company by numerous barriers, the shareholder cannot be identified with it.");
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 213 (1987) ("For purposes of

international law, a corporation has the nationality of the state under the laws of
which the corporation is organized."); see also Cedric Ryngaert, ExtraterritorialExport
Controls (Secondary Boycotts), 7 CHINESE J. INT'L L. 625, 628 (2008) (discussing
Barcelona Traction and the Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917).
256.
Cour d'appel, Gaz. Pal. 1965 at 476.
257.

Id.

258.
Id.; see also LOWENFELD, supra note 243, at 91-105; Ryngaert, supra note
255, at 629 ("A... French appeals court heard the case and decided that the contract
should indeed be honoured .... ").
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due to a desire on the part of the United States not to directly
challenge the French court's exercise of its own jurisdiction within its
own territory.2 59 The Fruehauf case does not necessarily imply that
extraterritorial measures are illegal, but serves as a reminder that
there is no guarantee they will be recognized by the third country, the
jurisdiction of which can be said to take priority.
Applying the Fruehauf approach to more recent examples, the
question of competing jurisdictions comes into sharper focus. When
the United States enacted sanctions affecting third-country nationals
doing business with Iran and Cuba in 1996,260 complaints emerged
regarding the extraterritorial reach of those laws. 261 The HelmsBurton Act, in addition to imposing sanctions on third-country
nationals for doing business with Cuba, went so far as to create a new
cause of action against those nationals to expose them to U.S.
expropriation claims in the event that third-country nationals were
"trafficking" in expropriated goods. 262 European countries similarly
complained about the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act of 1996 (ILSA), which
outlined penalties to be imposed on third-country nationals that
invested more than $20 million in Iran's energy sector, 26 3 building on
earlier
executive
orders
that
extraterritorially
prohibited
reexportation to Iran of goods and technology originating in the
26 4
United States.

259.
See Note, Predictability and Comity: Toward Common Principles of
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1310, 1322-23 (1985) ("When the
United States asserts jurisdiction over activities occurring within the territory of
another sovereign, its action may well be perceived as intrusive and perhaps even
unlawful. In order to allay such perceptions, extraterritoriality doctrine should respect
the principle of comity among nations." (citation omitted)).
260.
Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996 (HelmsBurton Act), 22 U.S.C. §§ 6021-6091 (2006); Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104-172, § 6, 110 Stat. 1541 (1996).
261.
See Letter from the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of
Iran to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. A50/857
(Dec. 29, 1995); Brian J. Welke, GATT and NAFTA v. The Helms-Burton Act: Has the
United States Violated MultilateralAgreements?, 4 TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L. 361, 362
(1997) ("Since its passage, Canada and Mexico, and the European Union (EU) have
raised concern over whether the Act violates the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA) and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT),
respectively." (citations omitted)); Joaquin Roy, The "Understanding"Between the
European Union and the United States over Investments in Cuba, in 10 CUBA IN
TRANSITION 88 (Ass'n for the Study of the Cuban Econ. ed., 2010), available at
http://www.ascecuba.org/publications/proceedings/volumelO/pdfs/roy.pdf ("Nonetheless,
as far as attitudes are concerned, European countries showed a remarkable consensus
of opposition to the Helms-Burton law.").
262.
Helms-Burton Act § 302.
263.
See Iran and Libya Sanctions Act § 4(d)(1) (permitting an enhanced
sanction in order to hinder Iran's energy programs).
264.
Exec. Order No. 13,059, 62 Fed. Reg. 44,531 (Aug. 19, 1997); Exec. Order
No. 12,959, 60 Fed. Reg. 24,757 (May 6, 1995); Exec. Order No. 12,957, 60 Fed. Reg.
14,615 (Mar. 17, 1995). It should be noted that Security Council Resolution 1540
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As a response to the U.S. legislation, the European Council
enacted "Blocking Legislation" (Council Regulation 2271/96) declaring
the unenforceability of and forbidding compliance with U.S.
extraterritorial laws. 265 The European Council also filed suit with the
WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism, challenging the legality of the
Helms-Burton Act under the security exemption of Article 21 of
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). 2 66 The United
States and the European Union reached an "Understanding" with the
European Council that the WTO case would be dropped and the
United States would seek waivers under the Helms-Burton Act and
ILSA. 267 Although some domestic courts have addressed the legality
of extraterritorial controls, 268 their legality was ultimately not
considered by an international body, and the United States did not
269
undertake a legal commitment to waive the legislation.
The extraterritorial provisions of the ILSA were not applied until
2010,270 when the Act had been revised and supplemented by the

specifically calls upon states to maintain reexport controls and restrictions, effectively
putting an end to debate on their legality. S.C. Res. 1540, 3(d), U.N. Doc. S/RES/1540
(Apr. 28, 2004). Though somewhat controversial, export controls and nondiversion
assurances have been a longstanding and relatively common feature of U.S. export
control law. See, e.g., LOWENFELD, supra note 243, at 21, 30-34; Cecil Hunt,
Department of Commerce Controls on Reexports and Other Activity Abroad 143, 147
(Oct. 2009) (unpublished manuscript) available at http://www.wiltshiregrannis.com/
siteFiles/News/A794B945F2CEF21FC2F93726C2D35AEl.pdf (using the Department
of Commerce's Export Administration Regulations as an example of the United States'
extraterritorial control).
265.
Council Regulation 2271/96, Protecting Against the Effects of the
Extraterritorial Application of Legislation Adopted by a Third Country, 1996 O.J. (L
309) 39. For a more extensive analysis of Council Regulation 2271/96, see Harry Clark,
Dealing with U.S. ExtraterritorialSanctions and Foreign Countermeasures, 20 U. PA.
J. INT'L ECON. L. 61, 81-83 (1999).
266.
See Clark, supra note 265, at 87-88 ("In October 1996, the EU initiated
World Trade Organization ("WTO") dispute settlement proceedings against the HelmsBurton Act and the U.S. embargo of Cuba. The EU alleged that these measures deny
EU members' rights under General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (GATT 1994)
and the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) to export to Cuba and trade
in Cuban origin goods."). The WTO suit expressed concerns about ILSA, but it was not
formally a part of the suit. See id. at 88 ("The EU also articulated major concerns about
the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act but did not include that statute in its WTO case.").
267.
Memorandum of Understanding Concerning the U.S. Helms-Burton Act
and the U.S. Iran and Libya Sanctions Act, EU-U.S., Apr. 11, 1997 [hereinafter EUU.S. Understanding], reprinted in 36 I.L.M. 529, 530 (1997).
268.
See, e.g., Rb.-Den Haag 17 september 1982 (Compagnie Europdenne des
P~troles S.A./Sensor Nederland B.V.) (Neth.), unofficial translation available in 22
I.L.M. 66,
7.3.2 (1983) (holding that the U.S. extraterritorial regulations to
discourage investment in a Soviet pipeline violated international law); see also
LOWENFELD, supra note 243, at 296-300.
269.
See EU-U.S. Understanding, supra note 267, at 530 ("The US takes the
position that the present Understanding conveys no legal commitment that waivers
will be granted under ILSA.").
270.
See Seven Companies Sanctioned Under the Amended Iran Sanctions Act:
Fact Sheet, DEP'T ST. (May 24, 2011), http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/05/
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Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act
of 2010 (CISADA). 271 CISADA institutes comprehensive sanctions by
the United States that more aggressively target financial
transactions and investments relating to Iran's use of refined
petroleum products. 272 In contrast to the milder language of earlier
legislation addressing Iran's proliferation activities, CISADA declares
that Iran's illicit nuclear and weapons development activities
"represent a threat to the security of the United States, its strong ally
'2 73
Israel, and other allies of the United States around the world.
CISADA was enacted shortly after the Security Council issued
Resolution 1929274 and was followed by European sanctions that
placed restrictions on investments in Iran's energy sector and
prohibit the provision of banking, financial, and insurance services to
Iranian companies. 2 75 Since the change in policy among European
nations coincided with the objectives of U.S. laws, there has been
little, if any, protest from European quarters regarding the
extraterritorial reach of U.S. laws on this subject. New unilateral
sanctions targeting Iranian banking and oil interests, 276 as well as
the possibility of targeting Iran's ability to conduct electronic funds
transfers, 277 could dramatically impact Iran's financial interests.
Even where states protest the legality of extraterritorial sanctions,
they may still be effective because corporations may nonetheless
comply for business reasons.
The fundamental lesson emerging from this narrative is that
parity on the level of multilateral and international action will

164132.htm (imposing bans on export privileges, Export-Import Bank financing, U.S.
foreign exchange transactions, U.S. banking transactions and others transactions
under the ILSA).
271.
Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of
2010, Pub. L. No. 111-195, 124 Stat. 1312.
272.
Id. § 102.
273.
Id. § 2(1).
274.
S.C. Res. 1929, supra note 83.
275.
Council Decision of 26 July 2010 Concerning Restrictive Measures Against
Iran and Repealing. Common Position 2007/140/CFSP, 2010 O.J. (L 195) 39-60. For a
comparison of U.S. and EU sanctions, see Piero Molinario & Joost Toussaint, Speech at
The European Compliance Conference (TECC) Workshop 17, Living with Sanctions
(Apr. 15, 2011) (on file with author) and also Responding to ExtraterritorialLegislation:
The European Union and Secondary Sanctions, 124 HARv. L. REV. 1246, 1252 (2011)

("Although member states must still resolve some implementation details, virtually no
conduct by EU financial institutions or petroleum companies is prohibited under
CISADA but legal under EU law.").
276.
See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, Pub. L. No.
112-81, § 1245, 125 Stat. 1298, 1647 (detailing U.S. sanctions on Iranian banking and
oil industries); Council Decision 2012/35/CFSP Amending Decision 2010/413/CFSP
concerning restrictive measures against Iran, 2012 O.J. (L 19) 22-23 (detailing
European sanctions of Iranian banking and oil industries). See generally KENNETH
KATZMAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS20871, IRAN SANCTIONS (2012).

277.

KATZMAN, supra note 276, at 58-59 (discussing Senate Banking Committee
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supersede legal problems of extraterritoriality when the enforcement
of sanctions is concerned. 278 Indeed, Security Council resolutions
under Article 41 provide direct enforcement authority to states to
carry out those sanctions. 279 In the context of proliferation, the
resolution of jurisdictional conflicts is best effected through the
advancement of international norms that oblige states to take
preventive action when necessary, within a coordinated and
harmonized international framework.
B. CripplingSanctions: Approaching a Pre-ForceMaximum
Although references to "crippling" 280 sanctions are common in
reference to proliferation-suspect states, current international
sanctions against such states are targeted, as opposed to
comprehensive, and have not fully targeted the most sensitive aspects
of the economy. Crippling sanctions may be designed to inflict pain
more broadly than sanctions targeted at regime leaders, causing the
type of economic breakdown that cannot be sustained by a nation as a
whole. In the context of Iran, crippling sanctions are generally meant
28
to refer to a full embargo on imports of refined petroleum products. '
The United States and Europe have enacted sanctions to that effect,
yet those sanctions do not prevent nationals of other states from
providing those products, to the extent they are willing to risk the
loss of business with Western financial institutions. 28 2 International
sanctions on Iran and North Korea largely relate to financial
transactions and trade in areas that are broadly connected to

278.
See also id. at 1257 (arguing that increased diplomatic power at the level of
the European Union lessens the need for the EU to resort to international legal
protests in the context of extraterritorial U.S. laws).
See, e.g., United Nations Participation Act, 22 U.S.C. § 287(d) (2006). To the
279.
extent that a state acts beyond the ambit of Security Council Resolution, it may be
considered as acting under its inherent sovereign authority.
280.
David E. Sanger, U.S. Weighs Iran Sanctions If Talks Are Rejected, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 2, 2009, at A4 (discussing options to cut off Iran's supply of oil and gas).
281.
See id. Iran is said to rely on imports for approximately 40 percent of its
refined petroleum needs, although it claims to be swiftly increasing its domestic
refining capacities. Iran is the fourth largest crude oil exporter, and so the most severe
economic measure against Iran would be to cut off its exports, thereby depriving it of
80 percent of its export revenues and 60 percent of its overall budget. See Country
Analysis Brief: Iran, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., http://www.eia.gov/EMEU/cabs/
Iran/pdf.pdf (last updated Feb. 17, 2012); Iran Oil Exports Top 844mn Barrels,
PREsSTV (June 16, 2010), http://edition.presstv.ir/detail/130736.html (Iran).
282.
The United States has sanctioned third country national corporations
under CISADA, but the effect of those sanctions on Iran's oil imports has yet to be seen.
See Jonathan S. Landay, New U.S. Sanctions Hit Iran's Gasoline Imports,
McCLATCHY-TRIB. NEWS SERV. (May 24, 2011), http://www.mcclatchydc.com/
201 1/05/24/v-print/114682/new-us-sanctions-hit-iran-gasoline.html.
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military-industrial needs. 28 3 Despite the difficulties these sanctions
pose to Iran and North Korea, from a historical and legal perspective
they do not reach the level of the full-scope economic denial that is
possible under Article 41 of the UN Charter.
Sanctions may range from a prohibition on trade in certain
strategic goods, such as missile technologies, to a focus on economic
sectors such as oil or finance, to a comprehensive ban on all trade.
The most comprehensive international economic sanctions in modern
times were applied in Rhodesia and Iraq, although the Iraq sanctions
were accompanied by a humanitarian exception known as the "Oil for
Food" program. 284 Although the success of those sanctions may be a
dubious proposition, as historical examples, they demonstrate the
lengths to which the international community may go in imposing
full-scope economic measures to prevent and restrict behavior that is
considered to constitute a threat to international peace and security.
The case of Rhodesia offers a textbook example of how sanctions
may incrementally target an entire economy. In 1965, the whiteminority government of Southern Rhodesia, after refusing to extend
voting rights to nonwhites, unilaterally declared independence from
England, gaining international pariah status. 28 5 The Security Council
expressly invoked its authority under Chapter V11 28 6 for the first
time, declaring Rhodesia a threat to international peace and security
and imposing an embargo on oil and gas. 28 7 When the embargo was
violated at the port of Beira, the Security Council authorized the
288
United Kingdom to use force to interdict shipments at that port,
allowing it to legally maintain a blockade of that port for ten
subsequent years. 28 9 As the situation failed to improve, the Security
Council, in Resolution 253, instituted comprehensive sanctions
against Rhodesia, prohibiting all trade, banning investments, and
imposing a travel ban on regime members (with an exception for
humanitarian aid).2 90 Resolution 253 authorized action to the full
extent possible under Article 41, encouraging states to "take all
possible further action under Article 41" of the UN Charter. 291 The
question arose in Security Council debates as to whether a total ban

283.
See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1929, supra note 83 (identifying sanctioned industries in
Iran); S.C. Res. 1695, supra note 145 (identifying sanctioned industries in North
Korea).
284.
See S.C. Res. 825, 5, U.N. Doc. S/RES/825 (May 11, 1993).
285.

See LOWENFELD, supra note 243, at 427-35.

286.
Id. at 444-45.
287.
S.C. Res. 217, 8, U.N. Doc. SfRES/217 (Nov. 20, 1965).
288.
S.C. Res. 221, 5, U.N. Doc. SfRES/221 (Apr. 9, 1966).
289.
See generally James Kraska, Broken Taillight at Sea: The Peacetime
InternationalLaw of Visit, Board, Search, and Seizure, 16 OCEAN & COASTAL L.J. 1, 31
(2010) (discussing the economic sanctions enforced against Rhodesia).
290.
S.C. Res. 253, 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/253 (May 29, 1968).
291.
Id. 9.
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on communications was required under Resolution 253, but states
resisted the imposition of a total ban on the basis of human rights
concerns. 292 The Security Council also authorized the United
Kingdom, as the administering power of Rhodesia, to take "all
effective measures" to put an end to the uprising, arguably inclusive
2 93
of forcible measures.
The Rhodesia sanctions were plagued by implementation
deficiencies and did not prevent Rhodesia from achieving 6.5 percent
average growth rate in its GDP from 1966 to 1975.294 The denial
program is instructive, however, in that the Security Council
authorized states to take the full range of action permissible under
Article 41, and even authorized the United Kingdom to take limited
forcible action to enforce the sanctions. Assuming a blanket
authorization under Article 41, the question inevitably arises as to
what the limit is on measures to achieve a "complete or partial
interruption of economic relations." 295 Considering that Article 41
specifically excludes measures involving the use of force, the answer
to this question will depend on whether an action rises to that
level. 296 However, in the context of full-scope Article 41 action, the
range of possibilities for extraterritorial action is far greater than it
would be in the absence of such authorization. 297 Whether the
application of extraterritorial measures to "interrupt" economic
relations is permissible within the ambit of a blanket Article 41
authorization remains unclear. None of the sanctions targeting the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to date have provided
blanket authorizations under Article 41.
The Security Council imposed comprehensive sanctions in Iraq
in 1990 that endured essentially until 2003.298 The sanctions were
modeled on the Rhodesian sanctions, prohibiting all trade,
investment, and the making available of funds to Iraq for anything

292.

See generally James Crawford, The Relationship Between Sanctions and

Countermeasures,in UNITED NATIONS SANCTIONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note

38, at 57.
See S.C. Res. 253, supra note 290, 9.
293.
294.
See LOWENFELD, supra note 243, at 441.
295.
U.N. Charter art. 41.
296.
See id.
297.
There is some support for the proposition that extraterritorial enforcement
of national laws that do not conflict with public international law are legal. In the
Lotus case, for example, the Permanent Court of International Justice ruled that it was
not a violation of international law for Turkey to try the French officer of a ship that
collided with a Turkish ship on the high seas. See S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927
P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 16 (Sept. 7) ("Far from laying down a general prohibition to
the effect that States may not extend application of their laws and the jurisdiction of
their courts to persons, property and acts outside their country, [international law]
leaves them a in this respect a wide measure of discretion.").
298.
See S.C. Res. 661,
3-4, U.N. Doc S/RES/0661 (Aug. 6, 1990) (imposing
sanctions).
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other than humanitarian or medical purposes. 299 The Security
Council later authorized a blockade to enforce its original sanctions
resolution.300 The sanctions were widely understood to have had a
disproportionate impact on the people of Iraq, as opposed to its30 rulers,
1
but may have also served as an effective form of containment.
Humanitarian concerns
related to the imposition of
comprehensive sanctions have led to sanctions targeting specific
activities and persons in order to avoid causing unneeded strife to
populations. 30 2 As a legal matter, the outer limits of comprehensive
sanctions are contained in what is arguably a jus cogens 303
prohibition against denying a people basic subsistence, a prohibition
contained in multiple international instruments. 304 Indeed, a
European court recently reviewed legislation implementing Security
30 5
Council sanctions on the basis of jus cogens or peremptory norms,
and ultimately nullified implementing legislation on the basis of
30 6
European human rights law.
UN sanctions against North Korea and Iran have authorized the
inspection and seizure of banned proliferation-sensitive items and
have called upon flag states to cooperate with inspections on the high
seas, but they have not gone so far as to provide for extraterritorial
interdiction or blockade. 307 However, Security Council Resolution
1929, which deals with Iran, does appear to provide selective Article
41 blanket authority, insofar as it requests states to take "all
necessary measures" to prevent the transfer of technology or

299.
See id.
300.
S.C. Res. 665, 1, U.N. Doc S/RES/0665 (Aug. 25, 1990).
301.
See David Rieff, Were Sanctions Right?, N.Y. TIMES, July 27, 2003, at 41.
302.
See CHRISTINE GRAY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 269-72
(3d ed. 2008); Rep. of the Informal Working Grp. of the Security Council on General
Issues of Sanctions, U.N. Doc. S/2006/997 (Dec. 22, 2006) (discussing the design and
implementation of targeted sanctions).
303.
Jus cogens is a norm of international law from which there can be no
derogation. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 53, May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331; see also Princz v. Federal Republic of Germany, 26 F.3d 1166, 1184-85
(D.C. Cir. 1994) (Wald, J., dissenting) (discussing the role of jus cogens in a hierarchy of
international law norms, violations of which theoretically preempt the application of
treaty-based immunities).
304.
See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 1(2), Dec. 19,
1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 ("In no case may a people be deprived of its own means of
subsistence."); International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights art.
1(2), Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (same); see also Draft Articles on State
Responsibility with Commentaries, supra note 39, at 132. Humanitarian law also
prohibits starvation as a means of warfare. See, e.g., Protocol Additional to the Geneva
Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of NonInternational Armed Conflicts (Protocol II) art. 14, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609.
305.
See Kadi v. Council, 2005 E.C.R. 11-3649, para. 226.
306.
See Joined Cases C-402 & 415/05P, Kadi v. Council, 2008 E.C.R 1-6351
para. 334.
307.
See S.C. Res. 1929, supranote 83; S.C. Res. 1874, supra note 145.
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assistance to Iran's ballistic missile programs. 308 The legally
permissible extent of those measures will depend on whether they
constitute a use of force, which could not have been authorized under
Article 41.

VI. INTERFERENCE MEASURES: INTERDICTION AND CYBER ATTACKS

The advent of low-level conflict in the context of unilateral
counterproliferation efforts involves the use of measures that may be
said to occupy an intermediate status between nonforcible and
forcible actions, including industrial sabotage and cyber attacks. Such
measures, usually designed to interfere with or interrupt a nuclear
program, will in most cases involve some form of intervention in the
sovereign domain of the target state. The legal treatment of such
activities will hinge principally on whether or not they involve the use
of force, as this distinction determines whether they run afoul of the
international prohibition on the use of force.
One category of such measures is the interdiction and seizure of
sanctioned goods. It is not always clear whether interdictions rise to
the level of use of force. Questions may arise in this context as to the
proper boundaries between military force and police action on the
high seas. Similarly, it is not always clear whether measures
designed to interfere with or interrupt illicit proliferation activities,
such as cyber attacks, constitute forcible measures or armed attacks.
If they are not considered uses of force, they may be legally available
as countermeasures to address internationally wrongful acts such as
proliferation.3 0 9 If these actions do constitute uses of force, however,
they will not generally be available as a function of international law
without Security Council authorization.
The legal consequences of intermediate status preventive
measures will depend on whether those measures are uses of force,
and if so, whether they are low-gravity uses of force or whether they
rise to the level of armed attack. 310 In the context of nuclear
nonproliferation, the question of the legality of the activity being
targeted will also play a significant role in assessing the legality of
the counterproliferation measure in question. The concept of the use
of force under the UN Charter is broader than that of armed attack,

308.
S.C. Res. 1929, supra note 83, 9.
309.
Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 240 (providing supporting
references for assertion that forcible countermeasures are prohibited under
international law).
310.
See, e.g., Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), 2003 I.C.J. 161, 331 (Nov. 6) (separate
opinion of Judge Simma) (discussing "smaller-scale" uses of force); Military and
Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 12627 (June 27) (discussing uses of force of "lesser gravity" than armed attack).
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as the latter triggers the right of self-defense under Article 51 of the
UN Charter. 311 Low-gravity uses of force are prohibited under Article
2(4) of the Charter, yet they do not trigger a right of self-defense,
leaving the targeted state without the option of using force to
respond. This discrepancy creates "a large area where both a forcible
response to force is forbidden, and yet the United Nations
employment of force, which was intended to fill that gap, is
312
absent."
When interdiction and interference measures do qualify as uses
of force, they will likely occupy this low-gravity use of force "gap" that
prohibits the target state from responding with force. 313 The
threshold question in any analysis of intermediate status preventive
measures is therefore whether the action constitutes a use of force.
The next step in the analysis is to consider the legal consequences of
a resort to force. In this respect, the recognition of degrees of gravity
and correspondent consequences may provide helpful incentives to
states when forcible measures are concerned. 314 However, legal
consequences relating to degrees of gravity in the use of force are not
well developed under international law. The repercussions of lowgravity uses of force may merit additional, distinct treatment.
In the context of interdiction, the law of the sea supplies a
specialized legal regime to guide behavior. The key question on
interdiction, however, is whether it falls within the ambit of Article
41 nonforcible measures when such measures have been authorized.
Other forms of interference or interruption, such as cyber measures,

See, e.g., BROWNLIE, supra note 245, at 365 ("It is not to be assumed,
311.
however, that every unlawful use of force will involve an armed attack in the tactical or
military sense of the phrase.").
312.
Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. at 541 (dissenting opinion of Judge Jennings). On
modern iterations of the impracticably restrictive juridical approach to self-defense in
international law, see Theresa Reinold, State Weakness, Irregular Warfare, and the
Right to Self-Defense Post-9/11, 105 AM. J. INT'L L. 244 (2011).
It should be noted that prevailing international legal doctrine on the use of
313.
force does not recognize the unlawful character of the targeted behavior as a legal
justification for collective self-defense outside of the framework of the UN Charter. See
Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. at 110 ("[T]he lawfulness of the use of force by a State in
response to a wrongful act of which it has not itself been the victim is not admitted
when this wrongful act is not an armed attack.").
314.
Abram Chayes captures this dilemma in describing the handling of the
Cuban Missile Crisis:
If we ask the question what is the minimum Article 2(4) can be held to cover,
the answer will be that at the very least it is a rule against aggression and
surprise attack. Taken in this sense, and given the alternatives as they were
presented to the responsible -actors, we may fairly conclude that the rule of
Article 2(4) was a significant factor in determining the decision against air
strike or invasion and for the lesser measure of a quarantine.
ABRAM CHAYEs, THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS: INTERNATIONAL CRISIS AND THE ROLE OF
LAW 40 (1974).
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do not have the benefit of a clearly defined legal regime. To the extent
that Article 41 and 42 of the UN Charter guide interpretations of the
legal status of these measures, these alternative measures may be
said to occupy an undefined space in between the two. Under
applicable legal doctrine, however, they must be categorized as either
forcible or nonforcible.
A. Interdiction:State Action and InternationalLaw
Interdiction as a tool to prevent proliferation may arise in two
distinct contexts. First, a right of interdiction in the form of a
blockade may perfect enforcement of an embargo. In this context,
interdiction clearly constitutes the use of force under the UN Charter,
thus requiring Security Council authorization. 315 Such measures
have been authorized with regard to Southern Rhodesia, Iraq, Haiti,
Serbia, and Leone. 316 Second, a right of interdiction could apply
specifically to proliferation-sensitive items. In this latter context, the
right of visit, boarding, search, and seizure does not necessarily
constitute a forcible act. 317 The question then arises whether single
acts of interdiction may be considered nonforcible under Article 41. It
may be argued that the law enforcement characteristics of
interdiction conducted under extraterritorial domestic authority
3 18
represent an applicable legal paradigm to address this question.
The potentially overlapping legal frameworks involved in an

315.
Blockades are listed as measures involving the use of force under Article 42
of the UN Charter. U.N. Charter art. 41; see also BROWNLIE, supra note 245, at 365-66
("[A] naval blockade involves an unlawful use of force, although the tactical posture is
passive, since its actual enforcement includes the use of force against vessels of the
coastal state." (footnotes omitted)).
316.
See S.C. Res. 1160, U.N. Doc S/RES/1160 (Mar. 31, 1998) (Haiti); S.C. Res.
841, U.N. Doc S/RES/841 (June 16, 1993) (Serbia); S.C. Res. 665, supra note 300 (Iraq).
See generally Jochen Abr. Frowein & Nico Krisch, Article 41, in THE CHARTER OF THE
UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY 748 (Bruno Simma ed., 2d ed. 2002).
317.
Under law of the sea principles, the use of force may be said to occur at a
certain stage in the process of visitation of vessels, but the full process is not
categorically considered forceful. See, e.g., M/V Saiga (No. 2) (St. Vincent v. Guinea),
Case No. 2, Order of Jan. 20, 1998, 2 ITLOS Rep. 4, 7.
The normal practice used to stop a ship at sea is first to give an auditory or
visual signal to stop, using internationally recognized signals. Where this does
not succeed, a variety of actions may be taken, including the firing of shots
across the bows of the ship. It is only after the appropriate actions fail that the
pursuing vessel may, as a last resort, use force. Even then, appropriate
warning must be issued to the ship and all efforts should be made to ensure
that life is not endangered.
Id.
318.

See generally DOUGLAS GUILFOYLE, SHIPPING INTERDICTION AND THE LAW

OF THE SEA 276 (2009) ("A 'police action' is not something other than a use of force.").
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assessment of the legal character of nonproliferation interdictions
present a variety of possible approaches.
Under all relevant legal instruments, the bedrock principle of
interdiction law is that the right of visit to a vessel in international
waters requires the consent of the flag state under which a vessel is
registered, with limited exceptions. This principle is reflected in the
law of sea, under the Statement of Principles of the PSI, and in
various bilateral shipboarding agreements. 3 19 Flag-state jurisdiction
does not imply, however, that all interdictions are forcible acts, as the
boarding of vessels does not generally involve a use of force. But to
the extent that interdictions are not uses of force, they would still be
unlawful under the law of the sea in the absence of flag-state consent.
A variety of legal regimes may affect the analysis of whether
interdiction violates the prohibition on the use of force. These
intersecting legal regimes include the law of armed conflict, the law of
interdiction, nonproliferation law, intervention law, and international
and domestic criminal law. Despite the storied political history of
interdiction and nuclear weapons, the proper approach to assessing
the legality of interdiction of nuclear weapons or materials under the
use of force law remains unclear.
1.

Cuban Missile Redux

In the pre-NPT world, there was no enforceable international
legal norm against proliferation, and domestic criminal laws hardly
addressed the subject. 320 Vessels could roam the high seas carrying
nuclear materials, or even nuclear weapons, with the full protection
of international law. The UN Charter was in effect, but the Security
Council was largely paralyzed due to Cold War tensions and a heated
U.S.-Soviet arms race in which resort to UN procedures was not
feasible. This was the world of the Cuban Missile Crisis, when the
best available legal argument to interdict, or "quarantine," Soviet
missiles in transit came through a thinly supported reliance on the

Id. ("[T]he correct starting point must be that the exclusive jurisdiction
319.
principle renders a vessel immune from foreign interference unless there is a
permissive rule of international law allowing the interference or the flag state consents
to the interdiction."); G~inther Handl, The Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime:
Legitimacy as a Function of Process, 19 TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 1, 32 ("[The specific
operational language of the PSI boarding provisions is consistent with the traditional
allocation of jurisdictional powers between flag, port, and coastal states, except
perhaps in respect of interdiction measures in the contiguous zone.").
But see Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 42 U.S.C. § 2011 (2006) (regulating the
320.
use of nuclear materials); Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917, 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 1-44
(2006) (giving the President the authority to restrict trade with certain countries
hostile to the United States, including trade of nuclear materials); Export
Administration Act of 1949, Pub. L. No. 81-11, 63 Stat. 7 (allowing restrictions on
exports of nuclear nonproliferation materials to foreign nations).
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authority of regional organizations under Article 53 of the UN
Charter.3 21 A modern version of this scenario more likely concerns a
less symmetric environment, in which a state that does not
participate in any of the relevant legal regimes carries nuclear
weapons or related materials on the high seas. Nearly fifty years
after the Cuban Missile Crisis and forty-five years after the
enactment of the NPT, the question of whether it is a violation of
international law to interdict an illicit nuclear weapon on the high
seas remains a live one.
This issue was brought to a head in 2002 when a North Korean
shipment of Scud missiles was tracked on an apparently stateless
vessel (the So San) on the high seas. 322 In this particular case, the
law of the sea provided the necessary legal authority to board and
search the vessel, due to its apparent statelessness. 323 Were the
vessel North Korean, and had North Korea refused to cooperate, no
express international authority would have permitted interdiction on
the high seas, even if the vessel were carrying a nuclear weapon.
Considering the importance of flag-state consent to the law on
interdiction, international cooperation to procure such consent is
crucial to gaining the legal authority necessary to address
proliferation in international waters. An increase in bilateral
shipboarding agreements through the PSI framework and the SUA
Protocol has filled some of the proliferation gaps in the law of
interdiction. 324 Yet these cooperative arrangements leave a yawning
gap that theoretically shields noncooperative rogue states that might
transfer illicit weapons on the high seas.
A legal analyst confronted with the scenario of a rogue state
carrying a nuclear weapon on the high seas is not in much better
position today than during the Cuban Missile Crisis. The Law of the
Sea Convention specifies five exceptions permitting a right of visit on
a foreign vessel, as well as a general exception when acts of

321.
The analysis hinged on a memorandum of the State Department Legal
Advisor's Office that the authorization of the quarantine by the Organization of
American States was not an "enforcement action" under Article 53 of the UN Charter
because it was no mandatory upon member states. See Memorandum from the Dep't of
State, Legal Basis for the Quarantine of Cuba (Oct. 23, 1962), reprinted in CHAYES,
supra note 314, app. III, at 146-48.
322.

MARY BETH NIKITIN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34327, PROLIFERATION

SECURITY INITIATIVE (PSI) 1 (2011).
323.
Id.
324.
See, e.g., EMMA BELCHER, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, THE
PROLIFERATION SECURITY INITIATIVE LESSONS FOR USING NONBINDING AGREEMENTS

1-2 (2011), available at https://secure.www.cfr.org/proliferation/proliferation-securityinitiative/p25394 (arguing that a non-legally binding framework pledging to interdict
illicit weapons of mass destruction shipments between state and non-state actors is an
effective alternative to formal treaties for problems requiring immediate attention).
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interference derive from powers conferred by treaty. 325 The SUA
Protocol, while criminalizing acts of proliferation on the high seas, did
not create a right of interdiction absent flag-state consent.3 2 A lastthough hardly ideal-line of defense for the legal analyst confronted
with this issue may be through resort to Security Council Resolution
1540 and the extraterritorial application of domestic law
enforcement.
2.

Roving Police Authority

Acts of interdiction in non-armed-conflict situations may be
usefully considered under a criminal law paradigm of police action.
Although use of force principles gauged to the effect of an action may
limit possibilities in this regard, explicit or implicit Security Council
authorization of national criminal measures would tend to support
their legality. Resolution 1540, enacted in support of the PSI
initiative, did not create a right of interdiction, but it does reaffirm
the call in the 1992 Security Council Presidential Statement for
states to take "appropriate measures" to counter proliferation. 327 It
also requires states to develop effective national laws to regulate
proliferation and expressly recognizes the validity of extraterritorial
328
It
controls on products originating within the legislating state.
further calls on states to take cooperative action to prevent illicit
trafficking "in accordance with their national legal authorities and
'329
legislation and consistent with international law.
The legal analyst might argue that interdiction is justified in the
1540 framework either because the gravity of the violation of global
nonproliferation norms justifies exceptional enforcement measures as
"appropriate" under the relevant Security Council Resolutions, or
because interdiction is permissible on an exceptional basis 30 as a
valid extraterritorial enforcement of national law. An approach that
treats interdictions as unlawful interventions rather than uses of
force would provide more flexibility for the application of a law
enforcement model as a means to excuse interdiction in exceptional
cases.
In the event that the 1540 framework could be said to tolerate
roving national police enforcement authority over proliferation on the

325.
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 110, Dec. 10, 1982,
1833 U.N.T.S. 397.
326.
See SUA Protocol, supra note 31.
327.
U.N. Doc. S/23500, supra note 27, at 4.
328.
Id.
329.
Id.
330.
See R.R. CHURCHILL & A.V. LOWE, THE LAw OF THE SEA 216-18 (3d ed.
1999) (discussing exceptional measures involving interdiction on the high seas without
express legal authority).
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high seas, such authority would require effective domestic laws
providing the necessary penal and enforcement authority. To this
end, Resolution 1540 is facilitating the domestic criminalization of
WMD trafficking worldwide. Several states have reported the
promulgation of domestic criminal laws to cover WMD offenses,
pursuant to the committee created to oversee implementation of
Resolution 1540.331 The United States' radiological weapons law
applies a broad extraterritorial power on the basis of the offense's
occurrence in "interstate or foreign commerce, 3 32 while its nuclear
weapons law simply states, "there is extraterritorial Federal
'333
jurisdiction over an offense under this section.
Widespread criminalization of proliferation offenses facilitated
through Resolution 1540 enhances the legitimacy of claiming a
sovereign right to exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction in exceptional
circumstances. Such a process has to some extent already occurred in
the context of the global drug and sex trafficking trades, 3 34 and in the
335
more distant past with respect to the slave trade.
As a matter of domestic law, the United States has traditionally
reserved a unilateral right to apply its criminal laws
extraterritorially, with Congress expressly granting extraterritorial
interdiction authority in specific instances. 336 This authority has been

331.
See generally Report of the Committee Established Pursuant to Security
Council Resolution 1540 (2004), U.N. Doc. S/2008/493 (July 30, 2008) (discussing
criminalization efforts required by Resolution 1540 and carried out by reporting states
under domestic laws). For its part, the United States enacted two new criminal laws
with extraterritorial application to criminalize radiological weapons or other devices
intended to cause harm through the release of radiation or radioactivity and through
participation in the nuclear weapons program of a foreign terrorist power. See Letter
dated 21 December 2007 from the Permanent Representative of the United States of
America to the United Nations addressed to the Chairman of the Committee, Annex, at
4, U.N. Doc. S/AC.44/2007/10 (Apr. 12, 2010) (reporting that the United States has
criminally barred non-state actors from conspiring or attempting to build or obtain

WMD).
332.
18 U.S.C. § 2332h (2006). This language derives from broad congressional
authority "to regulate Commerce with Foreign nations" under the United States
Constitution. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
333.
18 U.S.C. § 832(b) (2006).
334.
For a discussion of extraterritoriality in the context of sex trafficking, see
Vicki Trapalis, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: A Step Towards Eradicating the
Trafficking of Women into Greece for Forced Prostitution,32 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV.
207, 227-37 (2002) (discussing international conventions authorizing extraterritorial
jurisdiction). See generally John Reynolds, Universal Jurisdictionto Prosecute Human
Trafficking: Analyzing the PracticalImpact of a JurisdictionalChange in Federal Law,
34 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 387 (2011) (discussing the Trafficking Victims
Protection Act and other U.S. extraterritorial measures to address human trafficking).
335.
See, e.g., BIN CHENG, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW AS APPLIED BY
INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 157 (2006) (citing Pelletier Case, 2 INT'L ARB.
1749-805 (1885)); infra notes 414-15.
336.
For a comprehensive review of American case law, see generally CHARLES
DOYLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 94-166, EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF AMERICAN
CRIMINAL LAW (2012).
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justified legislatively and in the courts under the "protective"
principle of jurisdiction, in which the nexus for enforcement is said to
be the security interests of the state, "to such an extent and to so
great a distance as is reasonable and necessary to protect itself and
its citizens from injury," 337 Traditionally, restrictions on
extraterritorial interdiction were few. In the 1804 case of Church v.
Hubbart, the U.S. Supreme Court approved the principle of
extraterritorial seizure authority of a nation in a case involving a
seizure and arrest by Portugese authorities off of the coast of
Brazil. 338 The Anti-Smuggling Act of 1935 defined "customs waters"
to include jurisdiction over foreign vessels outside of U.S. territorial
jurisdiction that are subject to a treaty or "other arrangement" with339a
foreign government, which enabled U.S. authorities to interdict.
The Marijuana on the High Seas Act of 1980 similarly authorized
extraterritorial jurisdiction over marijuana trafficking. 340 The
as
Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act applies extraterritorially
341
vessels.
stateless
over
jurisdiction
asserts
expressly
well, and
In United States v. Gonzales, the Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit upheld the application of the Marijuana on the High
34 2
Seas Act to a Honduran vessel 125 miles off of the coast of Florida.
Despite the fact that Honduras consented to the seizure, the court
stated that "[e]ven absent consent," the United States could prosecute
foreign nationals on the basis of the protective principle. 343 In
interpreting the legal principles animating the statute, the court
noted legislative "ambivalence" between respect for flag-state
jurisdiction and the United States' "long history" of extraterritorial
jurisdiction. 344 Considering that the legal authority to interdict is
distinct from the legal authority to prosecute, the ability to obtain
domestic criminal law jurisdiction over acts taking place on the high
seas leaves open the question of how domestic authorities may
conduct a seizure under international law. A right to seize persons
and property is nonetheless implied. The House Report on the
Marijuana on the High Seas Act captures the exceptional character of
extraterritorial jurisdiction when it recommends "the most

S. REP. No. 74-1036, at 5 (1935).
337.
338.
Church v. Hubbart, 6 U.S. 187, 235 (1804) ("[O]n the coast of South
America, seldom frequented by vessels but for the purpose of illicit trade, the vigilance
of the government may be extended somewhat further.").
19 U.S.C. § 1709(c) (2006).
339.
340.
46 U.S.C. §§ 70501-70507 (2006).
Id.; see also United States v. Suerte, 291 F.3d 366, 375 (5th Cir. 2002)
341.
(upholding the extraterritorial provisions of the Act in the face of due process
challenges). For more on court treatment of the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act,
see DOYLE, supra note 336, at 16-17 (discussing various court challenges).
United States v. Gonzales, 776 F.2d 931 (11th Cir. 1985).
342.
Id. at 938.
343.
344.
Id. at 940.
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circumspect and judicious consideration before exercising any
sovereign right of unilateral action in accomplishment of national
345
objectives."
Notwithstanding
the existence of extraterritorial
laws
criminalizing proliferation, the U.S. legal system remains imperfect
in terms of providing authority for warships to conduct interdictions
on the high seas pursuant to those laws. While the armed forces have
broad arrest and seizure authority in the event of armed conflict, the
legal situation is less clear as a function of law enforcement. The U.S.
Coast Guard possesses the statutory authority to exercise police
authority within the territorial waters of the United States, 346 but the
Army and Air Force do not possess general authority to enforce the
domestic criminal law of the United States under the Posse
Comitatus Act; they may only act under statutory provision or under
the authority of the U.S. Constitution. 347 The U.S. Navy and Air
Force are similarly subject to restrictions on cooperation with civilian
law enforcement. Notwithstanding questions over whether the Posse
Comitatus Act applies extraterritorially, 348 the Defense Department
applies the underlying policy extraterritorially, with exceptions under
relevant directives. 349 The Secretary or Deputy Secretary of Defense
may authorize military cooperation outside the territorial jurisdiction
of the United States, 350 but this must be done on a case-by-case basis
and presumably in cooperation with federal law enforcement
authorities.
Statutorily, there is no direct interdiction authority for
extraterritorial criminal law violations under Title 50 of the United
States Code, which addresses military powers. 351 The sole statutory
nuclear counterproliferation carve-out to the Posse Comitatus Act is

345.
H.R. REP. No. 96-323, at 6 (1979).
346.
The Coast Guard is not subject to the Posse Comitatus Act and possesses
authorities both as a domestic law enforcement agency under 14 U.S.C. § 89 (2006) and
as one of the "armed forces" under 10 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
347.
See 18 U.S.C. § 1385 (2006) ("Whoever, except in cases and under
circumstances expressly authorized by the Constitution or Act of Congress, willfully
uses any part of the Army or the Air Force as a posse comitatus or otherwise to execute
the laws shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than two years, or
both.").
348.
Memorandum from Office of the Assistant Attorney Gen., to General Brent
Scowcroft, Extraterritorial Effect of the Posse Comitatus (Nov. 1989).
349.
See Dep't of Navy, SECNAV Instruction 5820.7c, Cooperation with Civilian
Law Enforcement, at 5 (Jan. 26, 2006) (describing the U.S. Navy's policy to cooperate
with civilian law enforcement to the extent possible in enforcing U.S. federal, state,
and local laws); Dep't.of Def., Directive No. 5525.5, DoD Cooperation with Civilian Law
Enforcement Officials,
E4.3 (Jan. 16, 2009) (describing exceptions to the Posse
Comitatus Act). See generally Major Winston G. McMillan, Something More than a
Three-Hour Tour: Rules for Detention and Treatment of Persons at Sea on U.S. Naval
Warships, ARMY L., Feb. 2011, at 31.
350.
Dep't of Def., Directive No. 5525.5, supra note 349, 8.2.
351.
See generally 50 U.S.C. §§ 1-2822 (2006).
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found in the Criminal Code at 18 U.S.C § 831, which authorizes the
Attorney General to request the assistance of the military to execute
law enforcement powers for offenses relating to unauthorized
transfers or threats associated with nuclear materials. 35 2 However,
this carve-out only extends to the territorial waters of the United
States.3 53 The Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of
1996, a Title 50 statute, addresses interdiction yet oddly contains no
express authority for the military to conduct interdiction on the basis
of criminal law violations. 354 Criminal law aspects of United States
export and import control laws do not provide any extraterritorial
seizure authority either. 35 5 Domestic legal authority for a warship to
conduct an extraterritorial, interdiction would have to either flow
from the Attorney General, through a request to the Secretary of
of his
Defense, or directly from the President as a function 356
States.
United
the
of
laws
the
enforce
to
powers
constitutional
Assuming a state has relevant domestic authorities in place, the
extraterritorial application of those authorities to interdict nuclear
weapons in exceptional circumstances would provide one avenue for
overcoming the proliferation gap, albeit a somewhat controversial one
were such a principle to be exercised without limitation. 3 57 In the
event that a state exercises roving jurisdiction on the basis of
domestic penal laws, that state might then argue that under
Resolution 1540, a flag state is required to cooperate if proliferationsensitive activities are at issue. A lack of cooperation may be an
additional basis for interdiction as a countermeasure to respond to a
wrongful act.
3.

Interdiction and Force

Even assuming a valid law enforcement framework and an
acceptance that the extraterritorial exercise of police authority is
admitted under international law, the question of whether the
interdiction constitutes a use of force under Article 2(4) still follows. If
interdiction is considered categorically as a use of force under these
circumstances, the default rule would then be that interdiction is
illegal under international law unless justified as self-defense,

18 U.S.C. § 831(d) (2006).
352.
See id. § 831(c)(1).
353.
354.
See Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-201, 110 Stat. 2714 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 2313 et seq.).
See generally U.N. Doc. SIAC.4412007110, supra note 331, at 30-31
355.
(describing criminal sanctions under the International Emergency Economic Powers
Act).
356.
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
See CHURCHILL & LOWE, supra note 330, at 218 ("[T]he absence of any
357.
other criterion of any other limiting criterion ratione loci or ratione materiae makes
this principle one of enormous potential scope.").
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authorized under Chapter VII, or otherwise justified based on
emerging nonproliferation norms.
Overly broad construals of the use of force present unworkable
models for practical application. A recent example of this tendency is
the case of Guyana v. Suriname,358 in which an ad hoc arbitral
tribunal found that a relatively minor incident involving the
expulsion of an oil platform from a disputed area was an unlawful use
of force under Article 2(4). In that case, gunboats from the
Surinamese Navy warned the supervisors of the rig that they should
leave the area within twelve hours or face "consequences." 359
Suriname argued that its actions were lawful countermeasures in
response to a wrongful act-unauthorized drilling in a disputed area
of the continental shelf.360 The arbitrators disagreed, holding that the
measures were "more akin to a threat of military action rather than a
mere law enforcement activity. ''361 In reaching its finding, however,
the tribunal recognized that "in international law force may be used
in law enforcement activities provided that such force is unavoidable,
reasonable and necessary."36 2 Whether any coercive police activities
can meaningfully coexist with such a broadly applied prohibition on
force is unclear.
The tribunal in Guyana v. Suriname posed such a wide
conception of the use of force that it is difficult to conceive of coercive
measures at sea that would not constitute force. Such a wide
conception risks subsuming all acts of sovereign law enforcement into
Article 2(4), widening the use of force gap significantly. Such a
restrictive concept of self-defense (which diverges widely from state
practice) reflects a formalistic application of Article 2(4). This
approach deprives decision makers of more nuanced options that
reflect prudential considerations of necessity and proportionality.
That said, the province of what defines the use of force has not been
thoroughly staked out, leaving the concept open to some degree of
interpretation. Coercive measures that straddle the line of lowgravity uses of force might in this regard be more adequately
considered under legal regimes of intervention or countermeasures,
providing space for those areas of law to develop practical
applications.

358.
Guyana v. Suriname, Arbitral Tribunal Constituted pursuant to Article
287, and in Accordance with Annex VII of the United Nations Convention on the Law
of the Sea (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2007), http://www.pca-cpa.org/upload/files/GuyanaSuriname%20Award.pdf.
359.
Id. 433.
360.
Id. 441.
361.
Id. 445.
362.
Id.
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B. The Advent of Low-Level Conflict: Cyber Attacks
and Sabotage
With political controversy surrounding Iran's nuclear energy
program, reports have emerged of industrial sabotage and cyber
attacks targeting Iran's nuclear industry. While attribution of
responsibility for these operations may not be possible, the
international legality or illegality of such operations is nonetheless
relevant to the determination of appropriate responses, if any. Cyber
attacks and industrial sabotage fall into a grey area as actions that
may or may not constitute the use of force. If they do not constitute
use of force, the legal character of the action being targeted-that is,
whether it is wrongful or not-will be relevant to the legal character
of the coercive measure in question.
Cyber attacks represent a new challenge for international law.
As a threshold matter, cyber attacks must be distinguished from
forms of cyber exploitation, which serve to gather intelligence but do
not interfere with a system's operation or cause physical harm. 363 The
use of cyber attacks as a counterproliferation tool has come into view
with reports of computer malware known as Stuxnet, which targeted
industrial control systems associated with Iran's centrifuge
operations, causing the centrifuges to spin out of control. 364 The
application of these tools to interfere with nuclear programs with
suspected military dimensions raises novel issues of legality. Putting
aside problems of attribution for such an attack, 365 the question of the
legality of preventive cyber attacks largely hinges on whether they
are considered uses of force under international law. 366 If such
attacks are not uses of force, what legal consequences flow from this
type of intentional destruction of property in another state?
Cyber intrusions, consisting of exploitation and attack initiated
for criminal, military, or law enforcement purposes are gaining

363.
NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, TECHNOLOGY, POLICY, LAW, AND ETHICS
REGARDING U.S. ACQUISITION AND USE OF CYBERATTACK CAPABILITIES 32 (William A.

Owens, et al. eds., 2009) (warning of the dangers of conflating cyber attack and cyber
exploitation); Herbert S. Lin, Offensive Cyber Operations and the Use of Force, 4 J.
NAT'L SECURITY L. & POL'Y 63, 63-64 (2010);
364.
NICOLAS FALLIERE ET AL., W32.STUXNET DOSSIER, VERSION 1.4, SYMANTEC

SECURITY RESPONSE (Feb. 2011), available at http://www.symantec.com/content/en/usl
enterprise/media/security-response/whitepapers/w32_stuxnet dossier.pdf;
John
Markoff, Malware Aimed at Iran Hit Five Sites, Report Says, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13,
2011, at A15; William J. Broad & David E. Sanger Worm Was Perfect for Sabotaging
Nuclear Centrifuges, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 2010, at Al.
365.
See Lin, supra note 363, at 77 ("No one has come close to solving the
problem of technical attribution-the ability to identify the party responsible for an
offensive cyber operation based only on technical indicators and information associated
with that operation.").
366.
See id. at 74-79 (examining different scenarios to arrive at a better
understanding of what constitutes "use of force").
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increased attention in international and domestic law circles.
Analysts consider cyber intrusions under various legal models,
including regimes of criminal law, use of force law, and the law of
armed conflict. 36 7 It is generally agreed that the legality of a cyber
intrusion is determined by its effect. 368 Thus, if a cyber attack has the
same "effect" as an armed attack, then it will be treated as such for
legal purposes. 36 9 As a multiform instrument of intelligence, coercion,
or force, the effect of cyber intrusions and their attendant legal
regimes cannot be defined ex ante, although a default standard might
prove useful. Furthermore, with respect to state action in the
international context, international criminal law is largely
nonexistent at this stage of the law's development. While statesponsored attacks may be a matter of concern for domestic law
enforcement authorities, there are currently no international
instruments addressing state-sponsored cyber intrusions. 370 The
principal legal regimes applicable to state preventive measures
involving offensive cyber operations are therefore the law of force,
state responsibility, and the law of intervention.
A critical threshold matter in considering the legality of cyber
measures as preventive tools is whether the measures amount to a
use of force. If they do not, they may be reviewed against the
backdrop of state responsibility for countermeasures and principles of
nonintervention. In this context, unilateral cyber measures could be
legal in the absence of express Security Council authorization, as they
would not fall within the ambit of the Article 2(4) prohibition on the

367.

See, e.g., NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION [NATO], NATO 2020:

ASSURED SECURITY; DYNAMIC ENGAGEMENT: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE
GROUP OF EXPERTS ON A NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT FOR NATO 20 (2010) (discussing

whether cyber attacks can trigger the collective defense mechanisms of the NATO
Charter); Duncan Hollis, An e-SOS for Cyberspace, 52 HARV. INT'L L.J. 373, 391-92
(2011) (discussing the inadequacy of domestic criminal law regimes for addressing
cyberthreats); Siobhan Gorman & Julian Barnes, Cyber Combat: Act of War, WALL ST.
J., May 31, 2011, at Al (discussing United States' anticipated policy changes on
cyberthreats and laws of war).
368.
NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 363, at 33-34 ("The committee
believes that the conceptual framework that underpins the UN Charter and today's
law of armed conflict regarding the use of force and armed attack is generally
consistent with the notion that the effects of an action rather than the modality of that
action are the primary measure in judging its legality under the UN Charter or
LOAC."); Michael N. Schmitt, Computer Network Attack and the Use of Force in
International Law: Thoughts on a Normative Framework, 37 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
885, 886 (1999) (proposing a normative framework determined by the effects of the
cyber operation); Matthew C. Waxman, Cyber-Attacks and the Use of Force: Back to the
Future of Article 2(4), 36 YALE J. INT'L L. 421, 431-32 (2011) (discussing general
acceptance of the effects-based approach).
369.
NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 363, at 33-34.
370.
The only international treaty addressing the subject is not directed at
states. See Convention on Cybercrime, Nov. 23, 2001, C.E.T.S. No. 185 (encouraging
member states to adopt measures to prevent cybercrime by individuals or groups
within their nations).
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use of force. This would be the case under the law of countermeasures
if they are (1) necessary, (2) proportional to address a wrongful act,
371
and (3) instituted by a member of an especially interested group.
There are no bright line rules in determining whether apparent or
possible misuses of sensitive nuclear technology are internationally
wrongful.
On the other hand, if cyber intrusions are considered uses of
force, the succeeding question will be whether the cyber attack-rises
to the level of an armed attack, triggering a right of self-defense, or
whether the attack represents a low-gravity use of force, thus falling
into the use of force gap insofar as the target has no right to use force
in return. Corollary questions will arise in the context of broad-range
authorizations of Article 41 nonforcible measures. Judgments relating
to the forcible or nonforcible character of cyber intrusions are
therefore crucial to determining whether such measures could be
authorized within the scope of Article 41, or whether they require
further authorization under Article 42 as uses of force.
1.

Cyber Measures and the Use of Force

In the absence of an agreed definition on the use of force,
arriving at a clear standard to determine the effect of an intermediate
coercion tool is difficult. While the effect of the attack in terms of
physical harm caused would seem a useful measure, some
commentators have noted that often it will be the nonviolent
consequences of the attack that have a more severe effect than the
violent consequences. 372 States will wish to secure a broad right of
response. The legality of state action in this context will depend on
how restrictive international law is both on the offensive and
defensive uses of force. If force is defined broadly and armed attack
defined restrictively, 373 a large space will result for prohibited lowgravity uses of force that only permit nonforcible countermeasures in
response. There is no doubt that the dominant juristic view on the
defensive use of force is restrictive under international law, defining
armed attack and imminent armed attack at such a high threshold
that forcible measures of prevention cannot generally qualify as acts

371.
See infra Part VI.B.2.
372.
See NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 363, at 253-54 ("Thus,
cyberattacks on the controlling information technology for a nation's infrastructure
(whether or not it caused immediate large-scale death or destruction of property) would
be an armed attack .... ); Waxman, supra note 368, at 436 ("[TIn a world of heavy
economic, political, military, and social dependence on information systems, the
,nonviolent' harms of cyber-attacks could easily dwarf the 'violent' ones.").
373.
See Waxman, supra note 368, at 438-39 (discussing the permissive U.S.
position on self-defensive as a means of deterring small-scale attacks that would not
trigger self-defense under a restrictive approach to self-defense).
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of self-defense. 374 In the use of force context, however, the law is
largely undefined, as tools of cyber coercion were clearly not
contemplated as acts of military force at the time of the drafting of
the UN Charter.
The context in which Article 2(4) was conceived does not support
the inclusion of measures that disrupt communication, disrupt
economic activity, or even cause physical destruction in a nonmilitary
environment. The overarching animus of Article 2(4) is the
prevention of aggressive war; the Article was a direct successor of a
provision in the Kellogg-Briand Pact that outlawed recourse to "war"
generally. 375 The expansion of the term to refer to force implies
broader coverage, yet does not extend to every forcible intrusion on
state sovereignty. As Albrecht Randelzhofzer notes in his history of
Article 2(4), "The term does not cover any possible kind of force, but
is, according to the correct and prevailing view, limited to armed
force. '376 According to this view, the prohibition does not apply to all
measures involving physical force, but only to "one means of coercion,
namely military force."3 77 Ian Brownlie notes that Article 2(4) was
not limited to armed force-but was also not as broad as argued by
some of his contemporaries-in light of the "predominant view of
aggression" that drove the process of the United Nations' creation and
the Article's adoption.37 8 Under Brownlie's view, physical acts, such
as forcible population expulsion, the release of large quantities of
water down a valley, and the spread of fire across a frontier were
3 79
difficult to regard as uses of force.
Due to the lack of settled opinion on the breadth endowed to
Article 2(4), the existence of new tools of coercion will no doubt
reinvigorate this debate. Multiple commentators on the Declaration of
Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations
Among States 38 0 have pointed out that the prohibition on the use of
force was treated in this declaration as distinct from other forms-of
coercion. This was accomplished by considering military force under
the rubric of "force" and "economic, political or any other type of
measures to coerce another State" under the rubric of

374.
Analysis of this question typically applies to anticipatory self-defense. See,
e.g., GRAY, supra note 302, at 160 ('The majority of states reject anticipatory selfdefense.").
375.
Albrecht Randelzhozer, Article 2(4), in THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED
NATIONS: A COMMENTARY, supranote 316, at 116.
376.
Id. at 117.
377.
Id. at 119.
BROWNLIE, supra note 245, at 362.
378.
379.
Id. at 362-63; see also Randelzhozer, supra note 375, at 118-19.
380.
Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly
Relations and Co-Operation Among States, G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), U.N. Doc. A18082
(Oct. 24, 1970).
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"intervention." 381 As Gaetano Arangio-Ruiz notes, the declaration
382
itself does not distinguish differing legal consequences of these acts
and does not necessarily constitute a statement of law in any
event. 383 Moreover, the confusion surrounding
the term
"intervention," often used to refer to armed intervention,38 4 does not
provide a clear basis to distinguish the legal regimes in play. The
existence of a distinction between force and intervention does,
however, tend to reinforce the view that force is limited to military
force, or its equivalent, and that intervention is a broader concept.
The exclusion of economic and political coercion from the term
"force" is clear from the drafting history of the UN Charter. These
forms of coercion are generally incident to the lawful exercise of
sovereign rights. Measures to interrupt or interfere with computer
systems were not familiar to the drafters of the Charter or the
various committees. addressing the law of force, and the definition
considered applied principally to military force. An appropriate
default analysis would treat cyber measures as "other type of
measures to coerce" under the rubric of intervention, unless they are
clearly calculated to bring about the type of destruction associated
with military force. Shoehorning cyber attacks-attacks that do not
cause or are not associated with extensive physical harm-into a
prohibition that was originally designed to prevent aggressive war
would represent an undue expansion of Article 2(4). Cyber measures
do not fit neatly into a classification of political, economic, or military
coercion measures, and thus belong by default to the category of

381.
Id.
DECLARATION

at
ON

122-23. See generally GAETANO ARANGIO-RUIZ,
THE UN
FRIENDLY RELATIONS
AND THE SYSTEM OF SOURCES IN

INTERNATIONAL LAW 99 (1979); Frowein & Krisch, supra note 316, at 137-38
(discussing the unique qualities of military force when discussing coercion);
Randelzhozer, supra note 375, at 118 (explaining when "force" should be understood as
military force). Frowein and Kirsch note that the historical confusion on this point,
however, as this distinction was rolled back in the Declaration on the Enhancement of
the Effectiveness of the Principle of Refraining from the Threat or Use of Force in
International Relations, G.A. Res. 42/22, Annex, U.N. Doc. AfRes/42/22 (Nov. 18, 1987).
See Frowein & Krisch, supra 316, at 136-38 (discussing understandings of assistance
mandates in different situations).
382.
ARANGIO-RuIZ, supra note 381, at 99-100 (noting that separate legal
consequences for force and intervention are not delineated in the Charter or the
declaration).
383.
Id. at 93 ("There can hardly be any doubt, in conclusion, that the
declaration embodied in resolution 2625 (XXV)-the 'Friendly Relations' declarationis to be considered, from the legal point of view, as an instrument of purely hortatory
value.").
384.
Id. at 106, 127. On the overlap of intervention and force, see Military and
Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 108
(June 27) ("The element of coercion, which defines, and indeed forms the very essence
of, prohibited intervention, is particularly obvious in the case of an intervention which
uses force.").
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"other. 38s 5 They are by default nonforcible, and in this context should
be viewed primarily as a disruption to communications systems, as
described below.
Computer malware such as Stuxnet implants itself into a
computerized network, commandeering or disrupting communication
between components in an industrial control system via a
reprogramming of network communications systems. 386 Such
malware is, in this regard, a form of interference with a
communications network. Analysis of the effects of the virus therefore
begins from the fact that it acts as a form of communications
interference that may or may not have effects equivalent to military
force. The intrusion itself is not a physical intrusion in the traditional
sense; rather, it is a form of communication disruption. From this
default position, a determination of a forceful effect would depend
upon whether the interference in the communication system
triggered significant harm equivalent to an act of force in terms of
physical destruction. Causing a system to malfunction is itself not an
act of force, unless that malfunction resulted in excessive physical
damage or loss of life. Damage caused by cyber attacks is more likely
to be economic. Moreover, proceeding from the legal model of
communications interference, Article 41 of the UN Charter
specifically contemplates that measures involving the "interruption"
of all means of communication are nonforcible measures. 38 7 Just as
the inclusion of blockades within the ambit of forcible Article 42
measures provides prima facie evidence that blockades are acts of
force, 38 8 the inclusion of communications interruption in Article 41
would imply that communications disruptions are by default
nonforcible.
Whether cyber attacks trigger a right of self-defense justifying a
forcible response has been the principal concern of commentators
addressing the broader question of how to respond to cyber attacks.
As prevention tools to interrupt proliferation activities, it is unlikely
that cyber attacks would rise to the level of armed attack. However, if
a cyber attack were to cause the demolition of a uranium enrichment
site, use of force rules would come into play, and possibly questions of
whether the intrusion constituted an armed attack, thus triggering a
right of self-defense. No special legal status would attach to the fact
that an attack was carried out through a computerized channel,

385.
See ARANGIO-RUIZ, supra note 381, at 128 ("The 'forms of interference'
referred to [in the Declaration of Friendly Relations are indeed very hard to define in
positive terms. As our personal effort has not been successful we leave this matter for
more ingenious lawyers to resolve.").
386.

See FALLIERE ET AL., supra note 364, at 2, 17-18, 25 (describing technical

aspects of malware propagation and consequences).
U.N. Charter art. 41.
387.
388.
Id. art. 42.
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however. Because cyber measures are ill-defined in terms of their
effects and have not received thorough consideration in any
international venue, caution should be exercised in concluding that
cyber measures constitute the use of force when they do not cause
significant physical destruction.
2.

Cyber Measures, Intervention Law, and State Responsibility

Principles of nonintervention, while largely undeveloped as a
matter of law, 389 may provide useful guidance through the
assessment of cyber measures in terms of their intrusive effect on
state sovereignty. Although the content of the rule of nonintervention
has historically been ambiguous, 390 its basic parameters are fairly
clear. Intervention is a broad term that covers both military force and
nonmilitary forms of coercion. 391 For an action to constitute
intervention as a matter of law, the interference must intrude on the
sovereignty of the target in some way, affecting "matters which each
State is permitted, by the principle of State sovereignty, to decide
freely." 392 As Michael Wood notes, "The principle of non-intervention
is the mirror image of the sovereignty of States." 393 Not all forms of
interference will constitute intervention, however, as the action must
be "forcible or dictatorial, or otherwise coercive, in effect depriving the
394
state intervened against of control over the matter in question."

389.
See ARANGIO-RUIZ, supra note 381, at 130 ("[T]oo many jurists, while
rightly acknowledging the state of confusion that characterizes the concept of nonintervention, seem not to believe in the possibility of at least reducing that confusion.");
BROWNLIE, supra note 243, at 44 ("The term and the use made of it by governments
and writers have been a very considerable source of confusion."); Lori Fisler Damrosch,
Politics Across Borders: Nonintervention and Nonforcible Influence over Domestic
Affairs, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 1 ("[H]ow the norm [of nonintervention] applies to
nonforcible conduct is inadequately understood.").
390.
See, e.g, ARANGIO-RUIZ, supra note 381, at 2 ("The attempt to prove the
content of a presumed rule of nonintervention by testing tentative hypotheses against
states' known behavior turns out to be as difficult as trying to confirm theories about
New York City's jaywalking laws by observing pedestrian traffic patterns in midtown
Manhattan.").
391.
The principle of nonintervention is not expressly articulated in the UN
Charter, but flows from the recognition of sovereign equality of states contained in Article
2(1) and from customary international law. See Michael Wood, Former Legal Adviser,
Foreign & Commonwealth Office, Speech to the Meeting of the Chatham House
International Law Discussion Group, The Principle of Non-Intervention in Contemporary
International Law: Non-Interference in a State's Internal Affairs Used to Be a Rule of
International
Law:
Is
It
Still?
3
(Feb.
28,
2007),
available at
http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/Research/International %2Law/il2
80207.pdf (discussing the implied source of the nonintervention principle).
392.
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v.
U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 108 (June 27).
393.
Wood, supra note 391, at 2.
394.
OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAw 432 (Robert Jennings & Arthur Watts
eds., 1996); see also THOMAs G. WEISS & DON HUBERT, Non-Intervention, in THE
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The principle finds unique relevance in the context of intrusions that
do no rise to the level of the use of force.
An intrusion on industrial control systems operated by and
within a state would clearly constitute interference in the sovereign
domain of that state. While the regime of nonintervention has been
largely irrelevant in regard to economic measures-which are
generally legal exercises of sovereign rightsL-cyber intrusions provide
a clear example of unlawful interventions that fail to rise to the level
of the use of force. The law of intervention here finds a useful
application outside of the context of Article 2(4).
Under the legal regime of nonintervention, cyber attacks would
not be considered legal simply because they do not involve the use of
force. As a prohibited act of intervention, a cyber attack might be
illegal insofar as it targets a lawful activity and legal insofar as it
targets an internationally wrongful activity. This is an important
distinction. A cyber attack that shuts down a stock exchange will be
unlawful because it is directed at a lawful activity, while a cyber
attack that shuts down a banned centrifuge program could be lawful
if it is directed at an internationally wrongful activity. It is perfectly
conceivable that states could conduct "cyber wars" without ever
triggering the Article 2(4) prohibition.
The law of state responsibility provides a well-developed legal
framework of "secondary rules" to assess the legal consequences of
nonforcible interventions such as cyber measures. Nonforcible acts
that would otherwise be unlawful may be excused either on the basis
of necessity or as countermeasures addressing unlawful behavior.
Under the Draft Articles on State Responsibility, necessity may
provide a basis to preclude wrongfulness if the action is the only
means for a state to safeguard "an essential interest against a grave
and imminent peril," and it does not impair an essential interest of
the targeted state or the international community.3 95 This doctrine is
fairly restrictive, however, and can be invoked if the measure in
question is the "only way" to bring about a cessation of the targeted
396
state's unlawful act.
Countermeasures apply when actions that would otherwise be
unlawful are initiated to achieve a cessation of, or reparation for,

RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT: SUPPLEMENTARY VOLUME TO THE REPORT OF THE
INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON INTERVENTION AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY 16 (2001)

("Forms of interference that fall short of coercion in the internal affairs of a state also
do not amount to intervention. In fact, a central purpose of foreign policy is to persuade
other states, friend and foe alike, to enact changes in behaviour that are consistent
with foreign policy objectives.").
Draft Articles on State Responsibility with Commentaries, supra note 39,
395.
art. 25.
396.
Id.; see also Gab~ikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.) 1997 I.C.J. 7,
55 (Sept. 25) ("Hungary had means available to it, other than the suspension and
abandonment of the works, of responding ... ").
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internationally wrongful behavior. A state may take such action
unilaterally if it is (1) "injured" by the unlawful behavior, 397 (2)
"specially affected" by the injury, 39 8 or (3) part of a collective to which
an obligation to cease the unlawful behavior runs. 399 As discussed in
Part II, nonproliferation obligations may be considered erga omnes
legal obligations, running to all states insofar as those norms have
achieved high-order status through the NPT, state practice, and
multiple Security Council resolutions. When the Security Council has
expressly prohibited proliferation activities, the compliance
obligations of the targeted state may be said to run to all members of
the United Nations. Countermeasures must be proportional-that is,
commensurate to addressing the unlawful behavior targeted-and
may be calibrated to effectively address the gravity of that unlawful
act. 40 0 Cyber measures could therefore be legally used when the
targeted behavior is internationally wrongful. The targeting of an
illicit nuclear weapons program may fit this model of analysis,
although actions targeting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy
present a more problematic scenario.

VII. PREVENTIVE FORCE AND NONPROLIFERATION LAW

International law is highly restrictive on the use of force by
states without Security Council authorization. The scope of selfdefense to justify unilateral action on a preemptive basis has been
thoroughly vetted through debates relating to the Iraq War, which
have done little to produce consensus. 40 1 In the meantime, jurists
continue to facilitate an ever-widening gap by promoting
impracticably broad offensive restrictions and narrow defensive
permissions for the use of force. In the defensive context, as Theresa
Reinold notes, a divergence has already resulted between state
practice and international law doctrine. 40 2 Where preventive force is

397.
Draft Articles on State Responsibility with Commentaries, supra note 39,
art. 42.
Id.
398.
399.
Id. art. 48.
Id. art. 51. See generally Thomas M. Franck, On Proportionality of
400.
Countermeasures in InternationalLaw, 102 AM. J. INT'L L. 715, 715-16 (2008) ("[Ain
otherwise lawful response to an unlawful act, if it crosses the threshold of
proportionality, may become unlawful.").
See, e.g., Sean D. Murphy, The Doctrine of Preemptive Self-Defense, 50 VILL.
401.
L. REV. 699, 706-19 (2005) (summarizing different schools of thought in related
debates).
Reinold, supra note 312, at 246 ("[Tjhe question arises as to what balance
402.
can be struck between the traditional, restrictive interpretation of self-defense (which
is widely viewed as inadequate for dealing with the security challenges of the twentyfirst century) and what might amount to a relegitimation of war as the continuation of
politics by other means.").
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concerned, the doctrine of anticipatory self-defense has gained little
traction as a basis for justifying unilateral force. 40 3 The concept of an
"imminent" attack remains confined in nineteenth century
conceptions, as articulated in the Caroline case. 40 4 Notwithstanding
Ian Brownlie's early 1963 recognition that, due to the advent of longrange missiles in a state of readiness, "the difference between attack
and imminent attack may now be negligible,"' 405 carving out a
doctrine of anticipatory self-defense that does not eviscerate the
prohibition on the use of force has historically been an unworkable
proposition. Thus, unilateral preventive force does not occupy a sound
position under the current scheme of international law.
In the context of low-level conflict, numerous quandaries on the
law of force surface. It is unclear, for example, whether targeted
killings of Iranian nuclear scientists should be a matter of Iranian
domestic law or a question of international humanitarian law. In the
absence of an attribution of responsibility for such acts, it is difficult
to prove a nexus to international conflict, inviting the questionsimilarly posed in the context of terrorism-of whether such isolated
acts should be considered primarily a criminal law matter. Moreover,
under prevailing standards on the use of force, isolated killings would
likely not be considered an armed attack meriting the invocation of
self-defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter. 40 6 Forcible reprisals
for such targeted killings would therefore be problematic under
international law. The absence of clear-cut legal standards in the
context of low-level conflict suggests that international law is illequipped to deal with such situations.
Assuming that a state suspected of developing nuclear weapons
is the victim of an unlawful use of force targeting the cessation of that
activity, the suspect state may face the grim reality of having no
effective remedy. Although international law does not excuse the
unlawful use of force in the context of a counterproliferation strategy,
a state that has been isolated as a result of its alleged interests in
developing a nuclear weapon may be in the awkward situation of

403.
Id. at 247 (commenting that "[t]he Webster formula from the Caroline case
of 1837 continues to be the authoritative statement on the right to anticipatory selfdefense in customary international law" and then discussing ambiguities and legal
criticisms surrounding this approach).
404.

J.B. MOORE, Destruction of the "Caroline," in A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL

LAW 409, 409-12 (1906) (reproducing Secretary of State Webster's comment that
"[u]ndoubtedly it is just that, while it is admitted that exceptions growing out of the
great law of self-defence do exist, those exceptions should be confined to cases in which
the 'necessity of that self-defence is instant, overwhelming, and leaving no choice of
means, and no moment for deliberation"').
405.
BROWNLIE, supra note 245, at 368.
406.
See, e.g., Eritrea v. Ethiopia, Jus Ad Bellum, Ethiopia's Claims 1-8, 45
I.L.M. 430,
11 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2005) ("Localized border encounters between small
infantry units, even those involving the loss of life, do not constitute an armed attack
for purposes of the Charter.").
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having little support in the collective security apparatus for
addressing low-level uses of force. One prominent example is the
attack on the Dair Alzour/Ali Kibar nuclear site in Syria in 2007 and
the ensuing silence of the international community. At the time of the
attack, both the attacker and the nature of the facility attacked
remained unclear, though it later became clear that Israel launched
40 7
the attack.
The international response to the attack at Dair Alzour was
relatively muted, 408 with no Security Council condemnation (in
contrast with Israel's 1982 attack on the Iraqi Osirak reactor, which
was condemned by the Security Council in Resolution 487).409 On
May 24, 2011, the IAEA concluded on the basis of environmental
samples, satellite imagery, photographs, and other assessments that
the facility was likely a nuclear reactor that should have been
declared to the Agency. 4 10 The IAEA Board of Governors referred the
matter to the Security Council on June 9, 2011.411
Although it widely understood that the airstrikes on Dair Alzour
were an unlawful use of force, it is also undisputed that the muted
reaction signals an increasing lack of global political concern
regarding the legality of such low-level uses of force when the target
412
state is outside of international norms regarding nuclear policy.
The closest corollary in legal doctrine that captures the international
community's muted response to the Dair Alzour strikes is found in
the doctrine of "clean hands," 4 13 or the principle that "an unlawful act
cannot serve as the basis of an action in law."

407.
See David E. Sanger & Mark Mazzetti, Israel Struck Syrian Nuclear
Project, Analysts Say, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 2007, at Al.
408.
See DAVID ALBRIGHT & PAUL BRANNAN, INST. FOR SC. & INT'L SEC., THE AL
KIBAR REACTOR: EXTRAORDINARY CAMOUFLAGE, TROUBLING IMPLICATIONS 2-4 (2008),

available
at
http://www.isis-online.org/publications/syria/SyriaReactorReport12May2008.pdf; David E. Sanger, Pre-emptive Caution: The Case of Syria, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 15, 2007, at A8 ("The silence of the Middle Eastern countries that would normally
condemn an Israeli attack suggested that they, too, were worried about what was
happening in the Syrian desert.").
409.
S.C. Res. 487, U.N. Doc S/RES/487 (June 19, 1981); see generally Christine
Gray, The Use of Force to Prevent the Proliferationof Nuclear Weapons, 52 JAP. Y.B.
INT'LL. 101, 110-12 (2009).
410.
IAEA, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Syrian
Arab Republic: Rep. by the Director General, 33, IAEA Doc. GOV/2011/30 (May 24,
2011).

411.
IAEA, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Syrian
Arab Republic: Resolution adopted by the Board of Governors on 9 June 2011, at 2,
IAEA Doc. GOV/2011/41 (June 9, 2011).
412.
Andrew Garwood-Gowers, Israel's Airstrikes on Syria's Al-Kibar Facility, 16
J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 263, 290 (2011) ("Israel's failure to offer any legal
justification for its airstrike, and the muted international reaction to the Al-Kibar
episode, appear to be part of a recent trend in state practice indicating a broader lack of
concern over the legality of relatively minor uses of force.").
413." See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar.
V. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 392-94 (June 27) (dissenting opinion of Judge Schwebel).
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A prime historical example of the clean hands doctrine is the
Pelletier case (1885), 414 in which the United States took the position
that an arbitral award against Haiti for the seizure of the vessel of an
American claimant should not be enforced because the claimant was
engaged in slave trading. 415 Judge Anzilotti most succinctly summed
up the doctrine in The Legal Status of Eastern Greenland when he
stated, "[A]n unlawful act cannot serve as the basis of an action at
law. ' 416 This is essentially an adaptation of the Latin maxim ex
'417
injuriajus non oritur, or "no legal right can spring from a wrong.
In the Nicaragua case, the doctrine was considered and rejected, as
418
evidenced by Judge Schwebel's elaborate dissent on the matter.
The doctrine of clean hands currently has no force in law and does not
excuse an unlawful act of force. But the doctrine may be operative in
the political context, rendering international law somewhat
ineffective
as a
method
to secure
a
remedy against
counterproliferation attacks.

VIII. CONCLUSION: ALL ROADS LEAD BACK TO EFFECTIVE MONITORING
IN A COOPERATIVE POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT

The nuclear nonproliferation regime comprises cooperative and
coercive elements, each of which play a role in the development of
prevention and enforcement norms. On the cooperative side, the
principal prevention mechanism is found in the institutional and
legal framework of the IAEA, operating under the NPT
comprehensive safeguards system. The IAEA serves to monitor and
verify the peaceful uses of atomic energy, as well as offer technical
assistance in an environment in which nations can freely trade in
nuclear technology for peaceful uses. On the coercive side, the IAEA
defers to the collective security apparatus of the Security Council and
individual states for the enforcement of nonproliferation obligations.
Inherent in the global nonproliferation framework is a tension
between the deterrence value of coercive action and the fact that the
regime cannot exist without the cooperation of all states. The risk in
imposing aggressive prevention and enforcement measures is that the
cooperative framework will break down, and enforcement measures

414.
See CHENG, supra note 335 (citing Pelletier Case, 2 INT'L ARB., 1749805(1885)).
415.

FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 607 (1887).

416.
Legal Status of Eastern Greenland (Den. v. Nor.), 1933 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B)
No. 53, at 95 (Sept. 5).
417.
See generally BIN CHENG, supra note 414; H. Lauterpacht, The Limits of
the Operationof the Law of War, 30 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 206, 217 (1953).
418.
See Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. at 392-94 (dissenting opinion of Judge
Schwebel).
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will devolve into a proxy for interstate rivalries. Prevention and
enforcement norms are important in this context. A norm involving
coercive action in the nonproliferation context should remain fixed on
a singular overriding objective: creating conditions for a return to
good faith participation in the international monitoring system.
The spread of nuclear weapons poses great risks for
international peace and security. State and non-state groups may
face great temptations to remedy asymmetries in international
relations by acquiring and even deploying nuclear weapons. Yet
injecting more nuclear weapons into unstable and hostile
environments creates a greater likelihood that the weapons will be
used in either state or non-state conflicts. The law on nonproliferation
reflects these dangers in norms that are developed through the IAEA,
the Security Council, and state action. Throughout this evolution,
nonproliferation has come to occupy binding legal status as an
obligation erga omnes, that extends to all members of the
international community. The absence of a clear-cut definition of
proliferation makes enforcing the regime a challenge, underscoring
the importance of developing clear and consistent standards that can
be adapted across a range of circumstances to prevent the misuse of
potentially dangerous nuclear technologies.
Because nonproliferation is ultimately a question of threats to
peace and security, the task of devising appropriate measures
necessarily relies on mixed questions of law and policy. Decisions on
what constitutes a threat to international peace and security and
what constitutes appropriate responsive action are largely political
decisions, although nonproliferation law provides the basic
framework for the exercise of such decisions. Arriving at legal
standards that allow for consistency in the development of
nonproliferation norms requires a full accounting of factors that
signal heightened levels of risk and a reconciliation of those factors
with legal obligations. The development of consistent standards to
assess proliferation risk-and hence to provide the raw materials to
judge what additional measures of prevention and enforcement may
be necessary-starts and ends with the IAEA safeguards system.
Cooperative action within the framework of that system should be the
top priority of any prevention and enforcement efforts under the
nuclear nonproliferation regime.

